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This dissertation develops a theory on the use of costly collateral in a credit contract.
Existing theories advocate the function of collateral as an incentive device to reduce moral
hazard. However, they do not distinguish between the eects of collateral on moral haz-
ard regarding \risk-taking" from those on moral hazard regarding \shirking". I study a
model with two-dimensional moral hazard under two extreme market structures: perfect
competition and monopoly.
In the section \Risk-taking Moral Hazard" (Section 5), I isolate the eects of risk-taking
from those of shirking. I also study adverse selection in which consumer has one of two types
(good types and bad types). In the model, banks choose not to use collateral to mitigate
risk-taking moral hazard. In a perfectly competitive market, there is a unique separating
equilibrium with zero collateral for the bad-type borrower and positive collateral for the
good-type. I show that the latter is caused by adverse selection. In the pure monopoly
case, zero collateral is optimal for both types.
In the section \Shirking Moral Hazard" (Section 6), I consider shirking moral hazard
with a continuum of eort levels, but no adverse selection. In this case, the second-best
eort level depends on the trade-o between the marginal benet of eort (in terms of
increasing expected return of the agent's project) and the marginal cost (in terms of reducing
limited-liability rents). When collateral is not very costly, it is possible that the good-type
borrower exerts eort at a level that is higher than the rst-best, regardless of the market
structure. In addition, a lower cost of collateral and/or more competition can improve
Pareto eciency of social welfare.
In the section \Two-Dimensional Moral Hazard" (Section 7), I extend my results to
the case in which both types of moral hazard exist. Regardless of the market structure, I
show that collateral is not used to mitigate risk-taking but to encourage a more ecient
eort level. But when the optimal collateral to induce eort happens to be higher than the
interest rate, collateral also reduces risk-taking as a side eect.
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SECTION 1
INTRODUCTION
Collateral is a widespread feature in credit contracts. Berger and Udell (1990) note
that \collateral is an important part of more than 70% of commercial and industrial loans
made in the U.S.". Steijvers and Voordeckers (2009) show an increasing trend in the use
of collateral. The increasing importance of collateral has motivated numerous empirical
studies, and yet not much progress has been made in the theoretical literature during the
last decade. Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) and Boot, Thakor, and Udell (1991) remain the
seminal theoretical papers that empirical studies cite as motivation for their hypotheses.
However, existing empirical evidence regarding the function of collateral is mixed.1 The
disparity between theoretical and empirical research of collateral motivates this thesis.
I develop a theory that provides new testable implications and helps us understand the
mixed evidence in the empirical research. To study the incentive function of costly collateral
in a credit contract, I investigate a two-dimensional moral hazard model under two extreme
notions of market structures: perfect competition and pure monopoly. My model has ve
frictions: costly eort (shirking), limited liability (risk-taking), costly collateral, monopoly
power, and adverse selection (with two types of borrowers: good types and bad types). In
dierent sections, I consider dierent combinations of frictions.
The model suggests that banks use collateral primarily to encourage increased eort to
boost productivity. In particular, the cost of collateral has a comprehensive impact on eort
so that some borrowers (bad types) exert eort below the rst-best level in equilibrium and
banks require a low collateral level. In this case, collateral does not aect risk-taking. For
other borrowers (good types), eort might be higher than the rst-best level and banks
require a high collateral level. In this case, collateral has a side eect of controlling risk-
1For example, Jimenez, Salas, and Saurina (2006) document a positive association between borrower
type and collateral requirements. Berger and Udell (1990) and Chakraborty and Hu (2006) document a
negative association, and yet Cressy and Toivanen (2001) nd no association at all between borrower type
and collateral requirements.
2taking. Understanding the exact incentive mechanism of collateral helps banks design more
ecient contracts and possibly provides policy guidance in credit markets.
This thesis diers from the existing works in three key respects. First, I separate
the eects of moral hazard into two types: the \shirking" eect that mainly aects the
expected return of the agent's project, and the \risk-taking" eect that increases project
risk without altering its expected return. My model suggests that collateral attenuates
shirking moral hazard, while inhibiting risk-taking is only a side eect. Second, unlike
prior literature in which eort takes only two levels, I allow for a continuum of eort
levels. The resulting comparative statics dier signicantly from the existing literature.2
For example, the relation between the cost of collateral and the equilibrium collateral level
is not always monotonic (as in Boot, Thakor, and Udell (1991)). Third, I nd that in order
to induce a given eort level, higher collateral is needed when a bank has monopoly power.
In equilibrium, both eort level and collateral level are higher under monopoly than those
under perfect competition. Since collateral is socially costly, competition enhances social
eciency.
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. Section 2 briey reviews related papers in
the literature. Section 3 describes the main model of two-dimensional moral hazard under
dierent market structures. Section 4 provides a benchmark of what happens in the rst
best.
In Section 5, I separately investigate the risk-taking friction. I show that because
collateral is costly, it is not an ecient incentive mechanism to reduce risk-taking in
equilibrium. Due to limited liability, the borrower tends to choose a risky project so that
he can enjoy a high residual value when the project is successful. If the project fails, banks
bear the costs. In order to mitigate risk-taking, the collateral requirement must exceed the
gross interest rate.3 Otherwise, the borrower still prefers to take more risks because of the
xed expected return from the project.
I also study adverse selection in which borrower has one of two types: good types and bad
types. My model implies that banks use collateral to distinguish good types from bad types.
In the competitive equilibrium, the good-type borrower accepts positive collateral while the
2I am able to replicate results in Boot, Thakor, and Udell (1991) by allowing only two levels of eort
choices and using their assumptions in my model.
3In my model, loan size is normalized to $1, and therefore collateral can be interpreted as collateral
amount over loan size. I refer to it as \collateral" hereafter.
3bad-type continues to choose a zero-collateral contract. That is, the adverse-selection eect
dominates the risk-taking eect. Whereas in the pure monopoly case, zero collateral is
optimal for both types of borrowers because collateral is not an ecient signal in this case.
As a consequence, monopoly power reduces costly signal of collateral and thus increases
social eciency.
Another implication of the risk-taking model is that risk-taking can be favored in
equilibrium as long as it does not destroy value.4 In other words, using collateral to control
risk-taking is not necessarily ecient to the society as a whole, not to mention that collateral
itself can be costly. However, in this section, I assume that borrower's risk-taking actions
do not aect the project's expected return. Whereas in practice, borrowers might choose a
risky project with a low expected return.5 I address this issue in the next two sections.
In Section 6, I develop a model of shirking that complements existing theories of moral
hazard and costly collateral by allowing borrowers to choose among a continuum of eort
levels. Regardless of the market structure, my model conrms that banks use collateral
to induce higher eort. However, the equilibrium collateral level depends on a bank's
trade-o between the marginal benets and the marginal costs of collateral. On the one
hand, collateral serves as a punishment mechanism to induce higher eort and to reduce
the borrower's limited-liability rents. On the other hand, collateral introduces ineciency
because it is costly. In addition, the social cost of collateral plays two roles in the benet-cost
trade-o. The rst role is to make collateral less eective in reducing the limited-liability
rents which calls for decreasing eort below the rst-best. The second role is to induce
higher eort of the borrower to reduce default risk so that the expected loss of collateral
value is minimized. In equilibrium, the dominant eect is determined by dierent sets of
parameters. Therefore, the relation between the equilibrium collateral level and borrower's
actions (or types) is not as simple as shown in the prior literature. Rather, it depends on the
interactions of dierent frictions. I show that, when the social cost of collateral is moderate,
all else equal, good-type borrowers are more likely to pledge a higher (than the gross interest
rate) collateral level and exert eort at an above rst-best level. The intuition is that when
4This result is partially driven by the assumption of risk-neutrality. But even if I relax this assumption,
we can normalize everything to a risk-neutral world and it can be shown that risk-aversion is a second-order
eect. Therefore, assuming risk neutrality sets up a theoretical benchmark.
5In a world where banks are risk-averse, this is equivalent to the case when the borrower takes a negative
NPV project.
4collateral is not very costly, it is more eective in inducing higher eort from good-type
borrowers, and therefore banks use higher collateral for the good types in equilibrium.
In addition, I nd that with moral hazard but no adverse selection, competition enhances
social eciency. The intuition is that when a bank has monopoly power, high collateral is
required to induce high eort which increases the expected return of the borrower's project.
Nevertheless, in the case of perfect competition, banks must lower the collateral level in
order to compete with other banks. As a result, the social loss of collateral is lower under
perfect competition than under monopoly so that competition increases social eciency.
In Section 7, I combine the two types of moral hazard, shirking and risk-taking, into a
single model to investigate how collateral interacts simultaneously with both frictions. In
the model, borrower's choice of risk-taking aects project risk only, whereas his eort level
changes the project's expected return. In order to investigate the issue in practice that
the borrower's excessive risk-taking might destroy project value, I assume a complementary
relation between eort and risk-control action in determining default risk. I show that
most results in the previous two sections still hold. In particular, only in some cases does
collateral exceed the gross interest rate and have the side eect of inhibiting risk-taking.6
In Section 8, I discuss a few empirical implications with testable hypotheses and propose
future work in theory.
The model of costly collateral with two-dimensional moral hazard might also be applied
to several other important contracts. For example, in a contract of executive compensation
to determine the optimal use of equity and inside debt, the managerial ownership is similar
to the gross interest rate in a credit contract, whereas his inside debt position is similar
to the collateral requirement. When the manager values the inside debt less than the rm
does, inside debt is costly and my model is applicable. It can provide insights in the debate
of how rms decide their optimal use of inside debt when contracting is subject to moral
hazard. Another application is a loan contract between banks and the central bank. The
reserve requirement is equivalent to the collateral requirement, and my model potentially
explains why changing the reserve requirement might not be eective in controlling banks'
excessive risk-taking.
6Jensen and Meckling (1976) also show that with rational expectation, risk-taking might not imply
welfare loss if it does not aect expected return from the investment. They argue that agency costs of debt
occur when risk-taking does aect expected return. But they focus on the theory of agency costs and do
not study the function of collateral in a debt contract.
5Other related issues in a credit contract include alternative mechanisms for a bank
to prevent borrowers' value-destroying risk-taking. The most direct method is to enhance
monitoring. For example, banks might impose some restrictions on the choice of investment
projects indirectly through debt covenants (Rajan and Winton (2010)) or through lending
relationships (e.g., Berger and Udell (1995), Lehmann and Neuberger (2001), Chakraborty
and Hu (2006)).7 An indirect method could be to use other corporate contracts that involves
the decision maker of the borrowers, such as the CEO. Edmans and Liu (2010) argue that a
CEO's pensions and other deferred contingent benets can be viewed as an inside debt that
aligns his interest with the lender's and reduces borrowers' excessive risk-taking behaviors.
But this is a topic on the interactions among varied contracts in the corporation (in this
case, between compensation contracts and debt contracts), and it is beyond the scope of
this thesis.
7Rajan and Winton (2010) also argue that collateral can be used as a monitoring mechanism. But that
is beyond the scope of this thesis.
SECTION 2
RELATED LITERATURE
This thesis is closely related to two strands of the literature: that of moral hazard in
a credit contract (e.g., Jensen and Meckling (1976), Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), Chan and
Thakor (1987), Boot, Thakor, and Udell (1991)), and that of how competition interacts with
other frictions and aects social eciency in equilibrium (e.g., Besanko and Thakor (1987a),
Chan and Thakor (1987), Villas-Boas and Schmidt-Mohr (1999)).1 The distinct feature of
my model is that I consider two-dimensional moral hazard under dierent market structures
and discuss the implications on the use of collateral in a credit contract environment.
The problem of moral hazard has long been recognized in the credit market (Stiglitz
and Weiss (1981)) as well as in the labor market (Holmstrom (1979)). In his 1979 paper,
Holmstrom describes moral hazard as a problem that arises when agents' privately taken
actions aect the probability distribution of the outcome. Although actions might aect
the outcome by changing risk as well as expected return, Holmstrom (1979) focuses on the
eect on expected return as the main concern in the labor market is that agents might shirk
due to costly actions. He shows that the principal can induce desirable actions by sharing
prots with the agent in a risk-sharing contract.
In the credit market, collateral is used as another form of risk-sharing device to mitigate
the shirking problem. Instead of prot-sharing, collateral enforces loss-sharing in the event
of default. As a result, collateral induces higher eort from the borrower and reduces
default risk. However, due to limited liability, the borrower receives all the prots if the
project is successful and yet banks bear all the costs in default. Therefore, the borrower
has risk-taking incentives even in the present of collateral, unless the collateral requirement
is higher than the gross interest rate. In summary, there are at least two types of moral
hazard in the credit market: shirking and risk-taking.
1Of course, the moral hazard problem is also widely studied in other markets such as the labor market
(e.g., Holmstrom (1979), Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987), Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991), Edmans and Liu
(2010)). In the sense that I consider two types of actions that are interacted in a model, this thesis is also
related to the literature of moral hazard with multiple tasks as in Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991).
7However, papers in credit markets are vague in the types of moral hazard. As a result,
the function of collateral on moral hazard is not examined precisely. For example, in a
two-period model, Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) propose that collateral serves as a punishment
mechanism to prevent borrowers from taking too much risk.2 Later on, in order to incorpo-
rate the adverse-selection problem, Chan and Thakor (1987) use a one-period model instead
and conrm the incentive function of collateral. But they are both silent about the types
of moral hazard.
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) are among the rst to describe risk-taking moral hazard in
the credit market: \higher interest rates induce rms to undertake projects with lower
probabilities of success but higher payos when successful."3 They show that collateral
serves not only as a screening device for the good-type borrowers to distinguish themselves
from the bad-types, but also as an incentive device to reduce moral hazard. However, they
study adverse selection and moral hazard separately, with the same variable of borrower
type. Particularly, they model moral hazard by assuming that the project of a bad-type
borrower is riskier than that of a good-type one in the sense of Mean-Preserving-Spreads
(MPS).
Nevertheless, it is action but not type that is directly related to moral hazard. Tra-
ditional models of contract theory usually assume exogenous variable of type to model
adverse selection and use endogenous variable of action to model moral hazard. Chan and
Thakor (1987) and Boot, Thakor, and Udell (1991) dene a separate variable of eort and
combine adverse selection and shirking moral hazard in a single-period model. Chan and
Thakor (1987) assume costless collateral and discuss the eect of competition, whereas Boot,
Thakor, and Udell (1991) assume costly collateral but only investigate the case of perfect
competition. Both papers imply that the rst-best eort level is achieved when there is
shirking moral hazard. They also nd that all borrowers are required to provide collaterals
in most of the cases. This result is widely cited, especially in the empirical literature of
collateral (see Steijvers and Voordeckers (2009)), as the theoretical backup of the incentive
2While Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) does not consider imperfect competition, Petersen and Rajan (1995)
study a similar two-period model of moral hazard assuming a bank has monopoly power. They use the
interest rate that is charged by a bank as a proxy for the bank's monopoly power. But they focus on the
negative eect of competition on the value of lending relationship.
3They also call it the \adverse incentive eect". A similar concept is also raised by Jensen and Meckling
(1976) as the \asset substitution eect" or \agency cost of debt." In contrast, the other type of moral hazard,
the shirking problem, is similar to \agency cost of equity." Edmans and Liu (2010) also mention the two
types of moral hazard, but under the context of CEO compensation contracts.
8function of collateral to reduce risk. However, their results are based on two assumptions.
First, eort takes only two levels. Second, both eort and type improve a project's return
distribution in the sense of First-order Stochastic Dominance (FSD) which captures only
the eect of shirking.
This thesis relaxes these two assumptions and re-examines the incentive function of
costly collateral. By allowing for a continuum of eort levels, I show that the rst-best
eort level might not be achieved in equilibrium in most cases. In addition, collateral is
primarily used to induce higher eort, but it might not aect risk-taking, and even if it
does in some cases, it is only a side eect.
Boot, Thakor, and Udell (1991) also note that with shirking but no adverse selection, the
bad-type borrower pledges higher collateral than the good-type in a competitive equilibrium.
This prediction has been cited as the theory of the relation between collateral and borrower
type regarding the incentive eect of collateral to reduce risk. However, the empirical
evidence is mixed. Steijvers and Voordeckers (2009)'s review paper has summarized several
papers of mixed results but attribute them to the dierent eects of moral hazard versus
adverse selection. They try to ll in the gap between theory and empirical studies from the
empirical side, whereas this thesis does it from the theoretical side. In fact, Boot, Thakor,
and Udell (1991) have stated in their paper that the negative relation between collateral
and borrower type relies on the assumption that action (eort) and quality (type) are
substitutes in determining default risk.4 They also discuss the dierence between \default
risk" and \project variance" and caution that their results can be sensitive to the choice of
risk measures. However, some follow-up papers choose to ignore these statements and do
not construct their hypotheses precisely.
In contrast, my model shows that when eort and quality are complementary in deter-
mining default risk and collateral is not very costly, the good-type borrower pledges higher
collateral than the bad-type in equilibrium in most cases because their net marginal cost
of collateral is relatively lower. The implication is that the relation between collateral and
borrower type depends on conditions including the cost of collateral and how eort and
quality aect each other. This result might also provide guidance in the empirical research
of collateral (see Section 8).
4That is, the bad-type borrower's eort is more eective than the good-type's in reducing default risk.
In their Footnote 2, they mention that the case of a complementary relation is interesting as well, but they
do not explain why they focus on a substitutable relation instead. In Section 6, I show that this is not a key
assumption in my model.
9In addition, Section 5 of this thesis also investigates the adverse-selection eect in the
credit market. I use the standard screening model setting as in Rothschild and Stiglitz
(1976).5 The literature of adverse selection is widely used in dierent contract settings
such as the insurance market, the product market (e.g., Rochet and Stole (1997)), the labor
market(e.g., Spence (1973), Lewis and Sappington (1989), Jullien (2000), Guerrieri, Shimer,
and Wright (2010)), and the credit market (e.g., Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), Wette (1983),
Besanko and Thakor (1987b), Bester (1985)). But in this thesis, I only study it in Section 5
as an extension. More interesting extensions are discussed in Section 8.
The second strand of literature involves models that combine multiple market frictions,
such as moral hazard and competition. \Perfect competition" is a key assumption that is
widely adopted in models in nance. The prediction of a perfectly competitive credit market
is that, if a bank increases its interest rate by a small amount, borrowers switch to another
bank immediately. However, we do not see this happen in practice. In fact, anecdotal
evidence suggests that some local banks do have monopoly power and dominate the local
loan market. More and more papers study imperfect competition in some nancial markets.
Some papers (e.g., Besanko and Thakor (1987a), Chan and Thakor (1987)) address the
eects of competition by providing equilibrium results under two extreme market structures:
perfect competition and pure monopoly.6 Other papers (e.g., Villas-Boas and Schmidt-Mohr
(1999)) use the Hoteling setting to discuss the case of imperfect competition.7
In this thesis, I investigate equilibria under the two extreme notions of competition. I
study the combined eects of risk-taking, adverse-selection and monopoly power and show
that zero collateral is optimal for both types of borrowers when a bank has monopoly
power. This result is consistent with Besanko and Thakor (1987a) in which they study
adverse selection under pure monopoly. The implication is that competition might decrease
social welfare when there is no credit-rationing.8 Villas-Boas and Schmidt-Mohr (1999)
5Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) focus on a perfectly competitive insurance market. For the pure monopoly
market, I follow Baron and Myerson (1982).
6Mussa and Rosen (1978), Maskin and Riley (1984) and Rayo (2005) are examples in the product
market. Example in the labor market includes Boal and Ransom (1997), Bhaskar and Manning (2002),
Manning (2003a), and Manning (2003).
7The literature of imperfect competition can be traced back to Hotelling (1929) and Robinson (1933).
Rochet and Stole (2002) and Diaz-Diaz and Rayo (2009) are examples of its application in the product
market.
8While credit rationing is important in a model with adverse selection, this thesis focuses on moral
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also nd a similar result, but they use the Hoteling setting instead to study the eect of
imperfect competition.
Chan and Thakor (1987) combine adverse selection, shirking moral hazard and dierent
market structures. They show that competition reduces distortions in equilibrium. How-
ever, they assume costless collateral and focus on the distortion of credit rationing. They
also mention that their results rely on the assumption of costless collateral and results
might change if assuming costly collateral. In addition, they do not consider risk-taking
moral hazard. In contrast, my model assumes costly collateral and consider the interaction
between two-dimensional moral hazard and competition. Besanko and Thakor (1987a)
and Villas-Boas and Schmidt-Mohr (1999) also assume costly collateral but focus on the
adverse-selection problem. They show that monopoly power eliminates signalling and thus
lower the equilibrium collateral level and improves social eciency. This thesis complements
the existing literature by studying the case when there is moral hazard but no adverse
selection. My model predicts that more competition improves social eciency because
competition lowers collateral requirement and thus reduces the expected costs of collateral.
Table 2.1 compares models in dierent papers with dierent sets of frictions.
Table 2.1: Literature and Comparison
Paper Cost of Market Eort Adverse
Collateral Structure Choices Selection
Besanko and Thakor (1987a) both competitive NA Yes
(0 ≤  ≤ 1) monopoly NA Yes
Chan and Thakor (1987) costless competitive 2 Yes
( = 1) monopoly 2 Yes
Boot, Thakor, and Udell (1991) costly competitive 2 Yes
(0 ≤  < 1)
Villas-Boas and costly imperfect NA
Schmidt-Mohr (1999) ( = 0) competition Yes
This Thesis costly competitive continuum
(0 ≤  < 1) monopoly continuum
Section 5 Yes
hazard and credit rationing is only a second-order eect.
SECTION 3
MODEL
I study a principal-agent relationship between risk-neutral banks (principals) and a
risk-neutral borrower (agent) in the credit market, where the agent takes two private actions
e (eort) and a (risk-taking). These actions aect the outcome distribution of a project.
There is one period with three stages, as shown in Figure 3.1.
In the rst stage, each bank oers a $1 credit contract that requires a collateral level
and a gross interest rate (C; r) (r is one plus interest rate), and the borrower either accepts
or refuses the contract. If the contract is accepted by the borrower, they move on to the
second stage. Otherwise, no contract is signed.
In the second stage, provided the borrower accepts the contract, he chooses a project
and take two private actions e ∈ R+ and a ∈ R+. The outcome distribution of the project
depends on the endogenously determined actions e and a as well as the borrower's quality
type that is exogenously given as  ∈ R+. For tractability, I assume the project only has
two outcomes: success and failure.1 Upon success, the project yields a return of
eL
p(e; a; ) ,
.
.Bank: oers a contract (C; r)





.Outcome ~R is realized
.The contract is enforced
.Stage 3
Figure 3.1: Timing of Model
1This two-outcome technology has been widely used in the literature of credit markets to simplify the
calculation and retrieve analytical solutions for complex screening models, such as models with multiple
market frictions (Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), Besanko and Thakor (1987a)). Especially, like Besanko and
Thakor (1987a) and a series of follow-up papers, I set the project's return in the event of default to be
zero so that the model is tractable without changing the basic intuitions. Of course, this assumption is not
perfect because a project usually pays o something even if it fails in the real world. But what matters in
my analysis is the dierence between the two outcomes, and any real life outcomes can be normalized to the
setting here.
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where L is a positive constant and p(e; a; ) is the probability of success. If it fails, it pays
nothing.
To summarize, the project's return is:
~R = ⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
eL
p(e; a; ) with probability p(e; a; )
0 with probability 1 − p(e; a; )
Finally, in the third stage, the outcome of the project is realized and the contract is
enforced by court. If the project is successful, the borrower pays interest r to the bank
and keeps the project's return eL/p(e; a; ) (and does not lose the collateral C), while
the bank receives a xed payment of r. If the project fails, the borrower pays no interest
but gets nothing from the project and loses the collateral C, whereas the bank receives
only a discounted value of collateral C (0 ≤  < 1). Regardless of the project's outcome,
the borrower's eort e costs him D(e), which is an increasing and convex function in e.
Similarly, the borrower's action a costs him D(a), which is also an increasing and convex
function in a.
My rst set of assumptions includes basic assumptions that I will use throughout.
Assumption 1 (A1)
a. For any given , p(e; a; ) is smooth and strictly increasing in both arguments.
b. Eort e lies in a compact interval [0; e], and action a lies in the interval [a; a] where
a > 0. Moreover, any available choices of e and a satisfy 0 < p(e; a; ) ≤ 1.
c. The borrower has unlimited access to collateral.2 Moreover, L is large enough to
insure a non-negative utility for the borrower.
d. Collateral is costly: 0 ≤  < 1.
The distribution of the project's return ~R and (A1a) together imply that, given a
borrower of type , for a given action a, a higher eort level e improves the return dis-
tribution in a rst-order stochastic-dominance (FSD) sense, whereas, for a given eort e, a
higher action a improves the return distribution in a mean-preserving-spread (MPS) sense.
Particularly, for a given action a, a higher e increases not only the probability of success but
2In their Footnote 6, Chan and Thakor (1987) oer a story of (premature) costly liquidation of collateral
to explain the reason why a loan is needed even with unlimited collateral available. Also see Besanko and
Thakor (1987a) for a discussion of an adverse selection model with limited collateral.
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also the expected return from the project, whereas for a given eort e, a higher a increases
the probability of success without aecting the expected return. This setting allows a
separation of risk-taking from shirking. All else equal, a higher action a corresponds to
a less risky project, no matter whether it is measured by default probability or project
variance.3 Further, under this setting, the borrower can aect the expected return of the
project, regardless the value of a, by changing e.4(A1c) prevents a credit-rationing problem, thus allowing me to focus on the function of
collateral regarding its eects on both dimensions of moral hazard. Moreover, Section 5,
where I consider an adverse-selection problem, this assumption allows me to focus on the
function of collateral as a sorting mechanism. In order that (A1c) holds, L must be
suciently large.(A1d) is a crucial assumption.  measures how banks value collateral relative to how the
borrower does.  = 1 means both parties agree on the value of collateral. When 0 ≤  < 1,
they value the collateral dierently: the borrower values the collateral more than banks.
Consequently, when the project fails, the borrower loses C whereas a bank gets only C,
generating a dead-weight-loss that is equal to (1 − )C.
I impose Assumption (A1d) for two reasons. First, when  = 1, a simple contract
with C = r = 1 can trivially eliminate the moral hazard problem.5 Second, in reality,
collateral is costly in two respects. On the one hand, when a project fails, a bank needs
to liquidate collateral and convert it into cash, leading to a liquidation cost. On the other
hand, collateral might sometimes be rm-specic so it is worth more to the borrower than
to any other participations in the asset market (including banks).
In each section below, I will impose further assumptions to simplify my analysis.
Table 3.1 summarizes the variables and payos of the model.
A bank's expected prot from a credit contract (C; r) for a type  borrower is given by:
(C; r; e; a; ) = p(e; a; ) ⋅ r + (1 − p(e; a; )) ⋅ C − 1: (1)
3Boot, Thakor, and Udell (1991) discusses a potential conict in ranking risk using the two measures of
risk: default risk and project variance. This conict does not exist here with my assumptions on action a.
4In contrast, Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) assume that type aects the distribution of the project's return
in a MPS sense, while Chan and Thakor (1987) and Boot, Thakor, and Udell (1991) consider type and eort
both in a FSD sense.
5Chan and Thakor (1987) study shirking with  = 1 but when there is adverse selection.
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Table 3.1: Variables and Payos of the Model
Scenario Bank Borrower i Total Surplus
Success: r − 1 eL
p(e; a; ) − r −D(e) −D(a) eLp(e; a; ) − 1 −D(e) −D(a)
Failure: C − 1 −C −D(e) −D(a) −(1 − )C − 1 −D(e) −D(a)
The expected utility of a type  borrower is given by:
V (C; r; e; a; ) = eL − p(e; a; ) ⋅ r − (1 − p(e; a; )) ⋅C −D(e) −D(a): (2)
The expected total surplus of the bank and a type  borrower, given contract (C; r), is
given by:
S(C; e; a; ) = (C; r; e; a; )+V (C; r; e; a; ) = eL−(1−p(e; a; ))⋅(1−)C−1−D(e)−D(a):(3)
In what follows, I dene the equilibria of this model under two extreme notions of
competition among banks: perfect competition and pure monopoly.6
Perfect competition among banks produces credit contracts that maximize the bor-
rower's expected utility subject to two constraints: for a given type , each bank makes a
non-negative prot and the borrower has a non-negative utility.7 That is:
(C; r; e∗; a∗; ) ≥ 0; (IR)
and
V (C; r; e∗; a∗; ) ≥ 0; (IRV )
where e∗ and a∗ are the equilibrium eort and action given the contract C and r, for a
given type .
In equilibrium, each bank earns a zero prot. The reason is that, in order to earn a
positive prot, a bank has to charge a higher interest rate or higher collateral than its
competitors. However, when there is perfect competition, this will drive all its customers
away.
6The denitions here are for models with moral hazard in general. But in Section 5, because I also
consider adverse selection, denition of equilibria is restated following Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976).
7This notion of competition is similar to the T1 competition as dened in Chan and Thakor (1987).
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In the pure monopoly case, in contrast, the principal's program generates credit contracts
that maximize a bank's expected prot subject to the borrower's participating constraints(IRV ).8 In this case, it is the (IRV ) constraint that always binds in equilibrium.
In Section 4, I derive the rst-best allocation, which provides a benchmark of social
eciency. Section 5 and 6 study each type of moral hazard separately. In Section 7, I
consider both type of moral hazard jointly.
8This notion of competition is slightly dierent from that in Chan and Thakor (1987). Whereas they
consider competition among banks for a limited quantity of deposits, I choose to focus on the monopoly power
of a bank in the credit market. In particular, they assume that the deposit interest rate is endogenously
determined so that the bank's equilibrium expected prot is always zero. However, I assume that the cost
of deposit funding is xed at $1 (with a zero interest rate) so that a bank has monopoly power in the credit
market and can make a positive prot.
SECTION 4
FIRST BEST
Suppose the agent can self nance, so that there is no conict of interest.1 I now consider
the allocation of (C; e; a) to maximize the borrower's value (and therefore the total surplus).
I call this allocation the rst-best allocation.
Lemma 1 The rst-best allocation involves zero collateral (CFB = 0), an eort eFB such
that:
L =D′(eFB); (4FB)
and an action aFB = a if D(a) > 0 and aFB takes any value otherwise.
It is not surprising that zero collateral is optimal under rst best, given the assumption
of costly collateral. With zero collateral, the rst-best eort eFB reects the trade-o
between a higher return and the disutility of higher eort. By assumption, risk-taking does
not aect the expected return of the agent's project, so the rst-best risk-taking depends
solely by its costs.
In the next section, in order to obtain a general result, I assume that D′(a) > 0 (namely,
reducing risk-taking is costly) for all a. In this case, the rst-best risk-taking is a. I also
show that the second-best results with risk-taking and adverse selection hold even with
D′(a) = 0. In Section 6, in contrast, I assume D′(a) = 0 (so that reducing risk-taking
is costless) for all a. Without loss of generality, I normalize D(a) to be equal to zero to
simplify my analysis (see Footnote 2 in Section 7). In this case, the rst-best risk-taking a
can be any value.
1Equivalently, we can assume, for this section, eort e and action a are contractible.
SECTION 5
RISK-TAKING MORAL HAZARD
In this section, I combine risk-taking moral hazard (without shirking) and adverse
selection. My second set of assumptions is just for this section. These assumptions isolate
the risk-taking eect and introduce adverse selection.
Assumption 2 (A2)
a. There is no shirking problem: e always equals to 1 and D(1) = 0.
b. There are two types of borrowers: a good-type (G) and a bad-type (B), with G > B.
c. The cost of controlling risk-taking is D(a) = 1/2a2 where  > 0.1
d. The probability of success of the agent's project is p = aii (i ∈ {G;B}).
I assume e = 1 so that the expected return of the project is xed at Li for any given i.
But later in Section 7, I relax this assumption.
To model adverse selection, I use the standard screening setting (as described in Roth-
schild and Stiglitz (1976)). Each bank oers a menu of $1 credit contracts (C; r). Each
borrower knows his quality type i and chooses a contract from the menu to nance a
project. But i is unknown to banks before contracting. In this section, I consider a simple
example of two types of borrowers as stated in Assumption (A2b): the good-type (with G)
and the bad-type (with B).
2
1I generally assume that  > 0 unless otherwise specied and that  is not too big so that the borrowers
always get non-negative utilities. But of course,  = 0 is an interesting case in which risk-taking (that can
be generated with a low ai) is absolutely good for the social welfare in a risk-neutral world.
2Prior literature has dierent conclusions regarding whether the equilibrium results can be extended to
the case with a continuum of types. Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) discuss in their Footnote 7 about the
non-existence of equilibrium due to the benet of pooling. However, Chan and Thakor (1987) argue that
\the results with a continuum of types will be mostly similar to those obtained here" (either separating or
pooling). It is interesting to see whether this dierence in nding can be attributed to the introduction of
moral hazard eects. But I leave this issue to future research.
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0 with probability 1 − aii
Assumption (A2c) and (A2d) are to simplify the analysis so that I can also consider
adverse selection. With this setting, the variance of the project's return is given by V ar( ~R) =
L2i ⋅ ( 1
ai
− i). In this case, a good-type borrower can take an action to control risk-taking
more eectively than a bad-type one.3.
The following two subsections study the competitive screening equilibrium and the
monopolistic screening equilibrium, respectively.
5.1 Competitive Screening Equilibrium
This subsection studies the screening equilibrium in a perfectly competitive credit mar-
ket, using the Cournot-Nash type equilibrium concept in Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976).
Robustness is also established in the demonstrations.
5.1.1 No Frictions
I rst consider the Cournot-Nash equilibrium when there are no hidden actions and all
borrowers are of the same quality type 0. To nd the optimal contract in the perfectly
competitive credit market, one solves the following program:
max
C0;r0
V (C0; r0;a∗0 ; 0) = L0 − a∗00 ⋅ r0 − (1 − a∗00) ⋅C0 − 1/2a∗20 ;
subject to (C0; r0;a∗0 ; 0) = a∗00 ⋅ r0 + (1 − a∗00) ⋅ C0 − 1 ≥ 0:
That is, to maximize the borrower's expected utility given that banks make non-negative
prots. In Section 5.1.2, I introduce an additional incentive constraint (ICM) to discuss
risk-taking moral hazard, and I add another two incentive constraints (ICG) and (ICB)
to account for adverse selection in Section 5.1.3.
As I have shown in Section 4, the rst-best contract involves zero collateral and highest
risk-taking (aFB = a) if to control risk-taking is costly ( > 0). Under perfect competition,
3This is similar to the \IMRQ" assumption in Chan and Thakor (1987). But Boot, Thakor, and Udell
(1991) assume the opposite. I show that my results do not depend on this assumption in Appendix A. I
would like to thank Professor Shmuel Baruch for suggesting this interesting exercise.
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the optimal interest rate with a rst-best contract is then determined by the bank's break-




For the purpose of the following analysis, I also illustrate this result graphically. A credit
contract (C0; r0) is represented in Figure 5.1 with the horizontal axis C and the vertical
axis r. F is the competitive equilibrium contract that maximizes the borrower (0)'s utility
and makes banks break even.
For any given action a0, the borrower's indierence curves are represented by the light
(green) lines with a slope of −1 − a00
a00
(level sets of the function of equation (2) in Section 3).
The utility level increases as the lines move towards the south-west corner, because a lower
interest rate and a lower collateral level are good for the borrower. A bank's break-even
line is in bold (black) with a slope of −(1 − a00)
a00
. Any contract beyond this line makes
a non-negative prot for the bank. Because 0 ≤  < 1, a break-even line is always atter
than any indierence curves. As a result, the equilibrium contract F is located at the
intersection of the bank's break-even line and the borrower's rst-best indierence curve











Figure 5.1: Perfect Competition with No Frictions
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Equation (2) implies that any borrower's rst-best indierence curve would always pass
through the point (C = 1; r = 1). At this point, the borrower pays a xed cost of $1 and
gets the actuarial fair utility which happens to be the same as the rst-best utility. Because
r ≥ 1, with a negative slope, the borrower's rst-best indierence curve is no longer valid
beyond this point. Although the risk-control action a is not directly presented in Figure 5.1,
a higher action results in a atter set of indierence curves and break-even lines with a lower
intersection on the r axis. Thus, for every value of a, we have a corresponding Figure 5.1
with corresponding slopes of the curves. Which action to choose depends on the cost of the
action: if  = 0, a∗ can be any value; if  > 0, a∗ = a. But with a higher equilibrium action,
the intersection on the r axis is lower and so is the equilibrium interest rate.
5.1.2 Risk-taking But No Adverse Selection
I consider the case when borrowers are of the same quality type 0 but their risk-taking
actions are now unobservable. With hidden actions, moral hazard problem arises. On the
one hand, the borrower chooses an action of risk-taking in his best interest given a signed
credit contract. He usually chooses to take as much risk as possible because of limited
liability. On the other hand, banks would take this into account ex-ante and oer an
optimal contract to induce a most favorable action.
In general, the borrower's actions aect the project's return in two aspects: expected
return and risk. Prior literature of moral hazard in economics, especially in labor market
models, emphasizes the eect on expected return. In those models, the principal desires
that agents exert high eort to achieve high expected return. The agents, however, tend to
exert lower eort than desired because eort is costly. This shirking moral hazard problem
usually can be solved by a prot-sharing contract that allows the agents to enjoy part of the
returns or to bear part of the losses and thus induces desirable actions. I discuss the shirking
problem in details in Section 6. But in this section, I focus on risk-taking. Mathematically,
I employ the Mean-Preserving-Spread (MPS) technology to describe the project's return.
The incentive constraint of risk-taking is therefore given by:
a∗0 ∈ argmaxa0V (C0; r0; 0; a0) = L0 − a00r0 − (1 − 0a0) ⋅C0 − 12a20;
or after simplication:
a∗0 =min{max{a; 0 (C0 − r0)};1}: (ICM)
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Proposition 1 In a perfectly competitive credit market with risk-taking moral hazard, the
rst-best contract can be achieved: C
′
0 = 0, r′0 = 1a0 , and the optimal action for the borrower
is a.
Equation (ICM) implies that with risk-taking moral hazard, any action a0 > a is never
chosen where there is zero collateral. Because collateral is costly, it looks as if action is
also costly (even when  = 0) and the borrower would want to choose the lowest action
possible. In Figure 5.1, because the rst-best utility level is not achievable beyond the
point (C = 1; r = 1), C ≤ 1 ≤ r. Together with (ICM), we can see that a is the optimal
action in equilibrium.
5.1.3 Risk-taking and Adverse Selection
So far I consider the case with borrowers of the same type. Now I consider borrowers
of more than one type that are unknown to banks. In this case, each bank oers a menu
of contracts to induce truth-telling and desirable actions. Each borrower then chooses his
optimal action of risk-taking based on the signed credit contract. However, it is not obvious
ex-ante whose (good-type or bad-type borrowers) expected utility would be maximized in
equilibrium. I follow the equilibrium concept as dened in Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976)
in the analysis.
Equilibrium in a competitive credit market with both risk-taking moral hazard and
hidden information is a set of credit contracts such that, when borrowers choose contracts
to maximize their expected utilities, (i) no contract in the equilibrium set makes negative
expected prots for a bank; and (ii) there is no contract outside the equilibrium set that, if
oered, makes a non-negative prot for any bank; and (iii) all the banks oering contracts
have taken into account the fact that borrowers choose their optimal actions for investment
after contracting.4
I consider a simple example with only two types of borrowers (i = {G;B}): the good-type
(G) and the bad-type (B). Suppose that the fraction of the bad-type borrowers is , and
thus the average quality is  = B + (1 − )G. Compared to the case in Section 5.1.2, two
additional truth-telling incentive constraints are required in equilibrium:
4Notice that Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) consider the insurance market model with adverse selection
but without moral hazard problem. Because my model also deals with risk-taking moral hazard, an additional
incentive constraint is needed in equilibrium that borrowers choose \ their optimal actions for investment
after contracting."
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V (CG; rG; G; a∗G) ≥ V (CB; rB; G; a^∗G) (ICG)
V (CB; rB; B; a∗B) ≥ V (CG; rG; B; a^∗B) (ICB)
where a^∗i ∈ argmaxa^iV (C−i; r−i; i; a^i). That is, a^∗i =min{max{a; ic (C−i − r−i)};1}.
In this case, there are only two possible kinds of equilibria: pooling and separating. In
the following analysis, I rst show that there cannot be a pooling equilibrium (see Lemma 2
and Figure 5.2). I then derive the separating equilibrium when C < 1 and  is large enough
in Lemma 3 (Figure 5.3): the bad-type borrower gets the rst-best contract (zero collateral)
while the good-type borrower is required to provide positive collateral (upwardly distorted).
The condition of  is also provided to insure the existence of the separating equilibrium
(Figure 5.4). Proposition 2 then concludes that this separating equilibrium is unique by
demonstrating that there is no sustainable equilibrium when C ≥ 1.
Lemma 2 There cannot be a pooling equilibrium.
Figure 5.2 demonstrates the nonexistence of a pooling equilibrium. The good-type
















Figure 5.2: No Pooling
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while the bad-type one is represented by the (blue) dash line, with a slope of −1 − aBB
aBB
.
Due to the same reason of costly collateral as I showed in Section 5.1.1 and 5.1.2, the
optimal pooling contract must involve zero collateral. Thus, Equation (ICM) implies that
a is the optimal action for both types of borrowers. Suppose the (green) dot P is the
pooling equilibrium, it must be on the bank's break-even line (CP ; rP ; ) = 0. It is the
(green) bold line with a slope of −(1 − a)
a
(It is also called the \market odds line".)
Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) have described the reason by exhausting alternatives. On
the one hand, (CP ; rP ; ) < 0 apparently violates the denition of equilibrium. On the
other hand, if (CP ; rP ; ) > 0, there is a contract that can slightly increase the expected
utilities of both types of borrowers and at the same time make a prot for a bank. It also
violates the denition of equilibrium. Thus, the potential pooling equilibrium P is located
at the intersection of the bank's break-even line and the indierence curves of both types
of borrowers.
However, P is not an equilibrium. For example, the good-type borrower might prefer
contract D, the (red) square in Figure 5.2, although the bad-type borrower still prefers P .
Because D is near P , banks can still make a prot from the good-type borrower (as long
as D is above the (pink) bold line, the bank's break-even line of the good-type contract).
That is, in order to maximize its prots, a bank would deviate to a contract like D and
attract only the good-type borrower. It disqualies P from being an equilibrium.
Lemma 3 When C < 1, for any  that is large enough ( > (1 − )(1 − aG)G(1 − )(1 − aG)G + G − B ),
there is a unique separating equilibrium where:
(1) both types of borrowers choose action a;
(2) the bad-type contract is rst best: CB = 0 and rB = 1
aB
;
(3) the good-type contract is distorted (a positive collateral but a lower interest rate):
CG = G − B
G − B[ + (1 − )aG] and rG = G + (1 − )
1
a − B
G − B[ + (1 − )aG] .
I prove Lemma 3 in two steps.
Step 1: With the help of Figure 5.3, I derive a potential separating equilibrium when
C < 1.
C < 1 ≤ r implies that any borrower's optimal action given any contract within this
region is exactly the corner solution a (see equation (ICM) in Section 5.1.2).



















the (blue) dash lines for the bad-type. The bold lines are the zero-prots lines: the (pink)
solid one for the good-type contract (with a slope of −(1 − aG)
aG
) and the (blue) dash one
for the bad-type contract (with a slope of −(1 − aB)
aB
). By denition, banks makes zero
prots from each contract in equilibrium.5 In other words, the equilibrium contract for the
good-type must lie on the (pink) bold solid line and that for the bad-type must lie on the
(blue) bold dash line. Section 5.1.1 has shown that with perfect information, each borrower
would most prefer the contract at the intersection of the rst-best indierence curve and
the zero-prot line. That is, point B for the bad-type and point G0 for the good-type.
However, this set of contracts B and G0 cannot be an equilibrium when type is private
information. As shown in Figure 5.3, contract B for the bad-type yields a higher interest
rate than G0 for the good-type. As a result, the bad-type borrower would want to mimic
the good-type to get better o. In order to induce truth telling, the good-type contract
ought to lie on the bad-type borrower's rst-best indierence curve. Thus, we have the
potential separating equilibrium contract set: B (the blue dot) for the bad-type and G (the
5The optimal subsidy argument is discussed in the second step of this proof.
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red dot) for the good-type.
Mathematically, this equilibrium results from maximizing the good-type borrower's
utilities subject to the incentive constraint (ICB) as well as moral hazard constraint and
the bank's zero-prot condition. It can be proved that the optimal good-type contract is
obtained with binding (ICB). Intuitively, all else equal, the good-type borrower is willing to
provide a collateral that is high enough to prevent the bad-type from mimicing. Therefore,
the good-type borrower gets an optimal utility of:
V ∗G = lG − 1 − (1 − )(1 − aG)(G − B)G − B[ + (1 − )aG] − 12ca2: (2G)
Step 2: Now that I have identied a potential separating equilibrium, the next step
is to demonstrate under what conditions it is sustainable. I explore alternative pooling and
separating equilibria that might potentially upset the prior separating equilibrium and show
that this is not an issue when  is large enough. But the details to derive the condition of
 are tedious so I move them to Appendix A.
First of all, a pooling contract like P ′ in Figure 5.4 is preferred by both types of borrowers



























are the market odds lines for a pooling contract P with dierent s ((CP ; rP ; ) = 0).
With a large enough , the market odds line always lies above the indierence curve of
the good-type borrower G1G, and any alternative pooling contract P
′ that is preferred by
both types of borrowers can only located in the negative prot region. In fact, I can show
that for any  > (1 − )(1 − aG)G(1 − )(1 − aG)G + G − B , no pooling contract can upset the separating
equilibrium of B and G. In contrast, if  falls below this percentage, there might be no
equilibrium in the competitive credit market.
Intuitively, when the two types are very dierent from each other (G ≫ B), as long
as there is a small population of the bad-type borrowers, each bank gets a negative prot
from a pooling contract. In addition, when collateral is more costly (smaller ), it is more
likely to end up with no equilibrium.
Second, when a bank is allowed to oer more than one contract, an alternative contract
set B′ and G′ might upset the prior separating equilibrium. As shown in Figure 5.4,
the bad-type borrower would prefer B′ to B and the good-type would prefer G′ to G.
Although a bank makes a negative prot from the bad-type borrower, the loss may be
subsidized by the positive prot from the good-type. That is, a bank might choose this
alternative contract set if on average they can make a non-negative prot. Similar to
Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976)'s optimal subsidy argument, I can also demonstrate that for
any  > (1 − )(1 − aG)G(1 − )(1 − aG)G + G − B , there is no other separating equilibrium that would
make a non-negative prot, because any deviation of the bad-type contract would lead to a
loss that is too big to be subsidized by the good-type contract. Interestingly, this condition
happens to be the same as the one that rules out alternative pooling equilibrium in Step
1.
Proposition 2 In a competitive credit market with risk-taking moral hazard and adverse
selection, when  is large enough ( > (1 − )(1 − aG)G(1 − )(1 − aG)G + G − B ), there is a unique
equilibrium as shown in Lemma 3.
In the following, I prove Proposition 2 by showing that no contract with C ≥ 1 can make
both types of borrowers better o and banks break even at the same time.
First, we have several observations for the case when a = a. As I stated before, equation(2) implies that the rst-best indierence curve of any type of borrower always passes
through the point (C = 1; r = 1). At this point, the collateral rate is the same as the interest
rate. The borrower's cost of debt is xed at $1. Therefore, the borrower has no incentive to
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increase or decrease the probability of success unless his actions are costly. It yields exactly
the same utility as does the rst-best contract. In the rst best, with zero collateral, a
bank's cost of $1 should be covered entirely by debt interest because the market is perfectly
competitive. It looks as if the borrower bears a xed cost of debt at $1.
Second, (ICM) implies that under risk-taking moral hazard, the borrowers might choose
an action a ≥ a if and only if C ≥ 1. Now I show that any alternative contract set with C ≥ 1
that can make both types of borrowers better o leads to a negative prot for a bank. For
a chosen action ai, the indierence curves of the type i borrower have a slope of −1 − aii
aii
.
Thus, a higher action makes the indierence curves atter and the bank's break-even lines
even atter (with 0 ≤  < 1). In Figure 5.3 or Figure 5.4, the rst-best indierence curve
for any type of borrower has already crossed the bank's break-even line. Therefore, any
alternative contract set beyond the point C = r = 1 cannot make both types of borrowers
better o and yield a non-negative prot for a bank at the same time. Thus, the separating
equilibrium of a contract set G for the good-type and B for the bad-type is unique.
5.2 Monopolistic Screening Equilibrium
I now consider monopoly. As I mentioned in Footnote 8 in Section 3, the equilibrium
concept here is slightly dierent from that in Chan and Thakor (1987). To also consider the
impacts of macro-economics conditions (such as risk-free rate) on the equilibrium results,
Chan and Thakor (1987) assume that the deposit interest rate is endogenously determined
so that a bank's equilibrium expected prot is always zero. But here I assume a xed supply
of deposit funding (at $1 with zero risk-free rate) and a bank might earn a positive prot.
This new denition allows me to study the bank's market power and compare it to that in
the perfect competitive case. But the equilibrium contracts should be the same as those in
Chan and Thakor (1987) if under the same setting.
The principal's program now becomes:
max
Ci;ri
(Ci; ri;a∗i ; i) = ⋅[a∗BB ⋅rB+(1−a∗BB)⋅CB]+(1−)⋅[a∗GG ⋅rG+(1−a∗GG)⋅CG]−1;
subject to V (Ci; ri;a∗i ; i) = Li − a∗i i ⋅ ri − (1 − a∗i i) ⋅Ci ≥ 0;
and (ICM); (ICG) and (ICB):
That is, to maximize the bank's expected prot given that the borrower who participates has
a non-negative utility and subject to three incentive constraints. In the following analysis,
I introduce each constraint step by step.
28
With full information and no moral hazard, a bank would never require the borrowers
to secure the loan as collateral is costly ( < 1). Contrary to the competitive case, however,
the good-type borrower is asked for a higher interest rate than the bad-type because the
good-type borrower brings a higher surplus to the bank (with a higher expected return of
Li) than the bad-type. In order to extract as much borrower surplus as possible, a bank,
as a monopolist, charges the good-type borrower a higher interest rate.
With asymmetric information but no moral hazard, there are two potential zero-collateral
equilibria: a pooling equilibrium or an equilibrium without the bad-type borrowers. Unlike
the perfect competition case where the bad-type has incentive to mimic the good-type,
in the pure monopoly case, it is the good-type who has incentive to mimic the bad-type
because he is charged a higher interest rate. However, the good-type borrower still has a
lower marginal cost to pledge higher collateral so the only way for the bad-type borrower
to distinguish himself is to lower his collateral level. Nevertheless, the lowest collateral level
is zero as in the full information case. In other words, collateral is not ecient as a sorting
mechanism in this case. Therefore, the pooling contract attracts both types of borrowers
but with a lower or even negative prot from the bad-type, whereas the good-type only
contract extracts the most prot from the good-type borrower but the bad-type simply
walks away. Which contract dominates in equilibrium depends on which one brings the
highest prot to banks. But in any case, zero collateral is always optimal. At this point,
my results are consistent with Besanko and Thakor (1987a).
With both asymmetric information and risk-taking moral hazard, a bank maximizes
expected prots subject to the borrowers' participating constraints and (information and
risk) incentive constraints. The additional incentive constraint is exactly the same as
equation (ICM) that I showed in Section 5.1.2.
With zero collateral in equilibrium, a is again the optimal action. I also nd that the
pooling contract always yields a higher prot for a bank, it is the unique equilibrium.
Proposition 3 In a purely monopolistic credit market with asymmetric information and
risk-taking moral hazard, there is a unique pooling equilibrium with zero collateral and the
same interest rate for both types ri = L
a
− a
2[B + (1 − )G] , and the borrowers would always
choose the optimal action of a.
To prove Proposition 3, I calculate the equilibrium prots for the pooling contract and
the good-type only contract:
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P = [B + (1 − )G] ⋅ ari − 1;





With Assumption (A1c), P −G =  ⋅(LB − a2
2
−1) ≥ 0, so the pooling contract is always
preferred by a bank in equilibrium.
SECTION 6
SHIRKING MORAL HAZARD
In this section, I consider shirking moral hazard (without risk-taking or adverse selec-
tion). The following set of assumptions is for this section only.
Assumption 3 (A3)
a. The action takes only one value and D(a) = 0.
b. D(e) is an increasing and convex function, and D′′′(e) ≥ 0. Moreover, D′(0) = 0 and
D′(e) = +∞.1
c. p(e; ) is linear in e with a zero intercept (so that we can write p(e; ) = epe).
d. p(e; 1) > p(e; 2) for any e and for any 1 > 2.
(A3a) assumes away risk-taking moral hazard so that I can focus on shirking. (A3b)
guarantees an interior solution for e. Finally, (A3c) and (A3d) simplify the analysis. (A3d)
implies that the borrower's quality  improves the return distribution in a First-order-
Stochastic-Dominance (FSD) sense.2 Most results in this section hold without these two
assumptions except for Corollary 1 (see Section 6.1 for more details). A simple example
that satises all assumptions in (A1) and (A3) is p(e; ) = e.
6.1 Perfect Competition with Shirking
Now I consider the second-best equilibrium in a perfectly competitive credit market with
shirking moral hazard only. As described in Section 3, perfect competition for loans among
1This is similar to the Inada condition.
2That is, quality type  and eort e are partially complementary in determining default risk. This
assumption is consistent with Chan and Thakor (1987), but the opposite to that in Boot, Thakor, and Udell
(1991) where they assume a substitutable relation. Since this paper focuses on moral hazard rather than
adverse selection, this is not a key assumption.
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banks produces credit contracts that maximize borrowers' expected utilities subject to two
constraints (IR) and (IRV ).
Faced with a credit contract (C; r), each borrower chooses an optimal eort level e∗ that
maximizes his expected utility:
e∗ ∈ argmax
e
V (C; r; e; )
It can be rewritten with the following rst-order condition:3
L =D′(e∗) − pe ⋅ (C − r): (ICe)
I then study the impact of shirking moral hazard in equilibrium by solving the following
program for the principal (let p∗ = p(e∗; )):
max
C;r
V (C; r; e∗; ) = e∗L − p∗ ⋅ r − (1 − p∗) ⋅C −D(e∗); (2′)
subject to (IR); (IRV ) and (ICe):
This is a maximization problem with three endogenous variables. It needs additional
assumptions to insure the existence and uniqueness of an optimal solution. In the following,
I rewrite (2′) as a function of e and derive sucient conditions for my equilibrium results.
Although the borrower chooses an eort level only after he and a bank both sign on
the credit contract, it is mathematically more convenient to solve for the second-best eort
rst. Following prior literature of shirking moral hazard, I replace C and r by functions of
e into the principal's objective function and solve for the optimal e.4 Using (ICe) and the
binding (IR) (as explained in Section 3), I denote ∗ =  + (1 − ) ⋅ p∗, and rewrite the
equilibrium contract (C∗; r∗) as follows:
C∗ = 1 − e∗(L −D′(e∗))
∗ ; (5)
r∗ = 1 + (∗/p∗ − 1) ⋅ e∗(L −D′(e∗))
∗ : (6)
It is as if a bank has a rational expectation of how the borrower would react to a specic
contract (Cj ; rj) by choosing an optimal eort level e∗j , and therefore designs an optimal
3I assume that e satises Assumption (A1) (e is not too large) and (A3) (e is not too small) to avoid
corner solutions. Furthermore, Lemma 4 derives sucient conditions for the \rst-order approach" to be
valid under my model setting. The reasoning is similar to Grossman and Hart (1983).
4In Chapter 5 of their book \The Theory of Incentives," Laont and Martimort (2002) provide a method
to solve the moral hazard model of \Two Outcomes with A Continuum of Eort Levels."
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contract accordingly to mitigate the shirking problem. As a consequence, each feasible
contract (Cj ; rj) has a one-to-one mapping to an optimal eort level e∗j according to (ICe).
In addition, given e∗j , each pair of Cj and rj is also a one-to-one mapping to each other
according to the binding (IR).
In summary, the equilibrium is as if a bank maximizes the borrower's utility by picking
an optimal eort level for the borrower. Let p(e) = p(e; ) and (e) =  + (1− ) ⋅ p(e), and
the principal's program is reduced to a function of e:
max
e
V (e; ) = 1
(e) ⋅ [eL − 1 − (1 − (e)) ⋅ eD′(e)] −D(e): (2′e)





2(e) ⋅ [ ⋅ (L −D′(e)) + (1 − ) ⋅ pe − (e)(1 − (e)) ⋅ eD′′(e)]: (FOCc)
d2V (e; )
de2
= −2(1 − ) ⋅ pe
(e) ⋅ dV (e; )de − [2(1 + ) − 3(e)] ⋅D′′(e) + (1 − (e)) ⋅ eD′′′(e)(e) :(SOCc)
In order to use the \rst-order approach" in discussing solutions of e, we need an
additional assumption in the following set:
Assumption 4 (A4)




≤  < 1 and D′(e) is not too large relative to L so that we have
d2V (e; )
de2
≤ 0 for any e.
Lemma 4 With Assumptions (A1), (A3), and (A4a), the equilibrium eort under moral
hazard must be a solution from the \rst-order approach" (See proof in Appendix A).
Grossman and Hart (1983) show that the \rst-order approach" is valid if the CDFC
(Concavity of distribution function condition) holds. Lemma 4 is similar to such a state-
ment. The assumption sets (A1), (A3), and (A4a) make sure that d2V (e; )
de2




≥ 0. So the optimal solution of e must be either at the corners or among
the stationary points (where
dV (e; )
de
= 0). Because dV (e; )
de
∣e=0 > 0 and dV (e; )
de
∣e=e < 0,
we can rule out the corner solutions. As a result, the maximization problem of equation
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(2′e) is tractable using the \rst-order approach" with an extra step to compare several
potential equilibria. In fact, with a stronger assumption (A4b), the objective function is a
hump shape with only one stationary point, so that we have Lemma 5.
Lemma 5 With Assumptions (A1), (A2), and (A4b), there is a unique solution of e that
satises (FOCc) = 0 (See proof in Appendix A).
With Lemma 5, we can now use the \rst-order approach" and rewrite equation (FOCc)
as:
L =D′(eSB) +  c(eSB; ; ); (4SB)
where
 c(eSB; ; ) = 1

[(eSB)(1 − (eSB)) ⋅ eSBD′′(eSB) − (1 − ) ⋅ pe]: (NMCc)
Traditional moral hazard models (See Footnote 4) discuss the second-best eort by
comparing (4SB) to (4FB) in Section 4. In the second-best, in addition to the marginal
benet L and the disutility D′(eSB), there is a third component - the net marginal cost
of eort (called NMC hereafter). It is a function of eSB and is aected by borrower type
(), the cost of collateral () and the borrower's disutility function (D(e)). To facilitate
the following analysis, I denote it as  c(eSB; ; ) (see equation (NMCc)).
In their Chapter 5, Laont and Martimort (2002) show that NMC in their example is the
marginal cost of eort that is due to the agent's limited-liability rents and is always positive.
Because to reduce the limited-liability rents calls for decreasing eort, the second-best eort
level is always below the rst-best level.
Boot, Thakor, and Udell (1991) also study the competitive equilibrium with shirking.
However, they show that when there is shirking moral hazard, borrowers still choose the rst-
best eort level. By allowing only two choices of eort level, they overlook the ineciency in
eort level because of shirking and costly collateral. In contrast, in my model, the rst-best
eort level can be achieved only with a specic set of parameters (see Lemma 6).
Lemma 6 In perfect competition with shirking only, the rst-best eort level is achieved if
and only if  (eFB; ; ) = 0. And in this case, CSB = rSB = 1
(eFB) .




(eSB)) ⋅eSBD′′(eSB) is the marginal cost of eort to reduce limited-liability rents (MCE).
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The second component
(1 − ) ⋅ pe

is the marginal benet of eort to increase the probability
of success (MBE). If the combined eect is a net cost, the results in traditional moral hazard
models remain the same that the second-best eort level is lower than the rst-best. If it
is a net benet, the second-best eort level can be higher than the rst-best. And that is
Lemma 7.
Lemma 7 With Lemma 5, the second-best eort level under shirking moral hazard can be
higher or lower than the rst-best level depending on the sign of the net marginal cost of
eort  (eSB; ; ).
The following analysis focuses on how dierent frictions change the sign of   and thus
determine the optimal eort level and contract under shirking moral hazard.
Clearly, if  = 1,   = 0. In this case, (4SB) is exactly the same as (4FB) and moral
hazard is not an issue. If 0 ≤  < 1
2
, moral hazard has a comprehensive eect and there may
be multiple stationary points (Lemma 4). Thus, in order to obtain intuitive properties, the
following analysis is based on Assumption (A4b) that collateral is costly but not too costly
to sabotage the equilibrium (Lemma 5 with
1
2
≤  < 1).
Proposition 4 In perfect competition with shirking only, there is a unique optimal solution
of eSB = e∗1 that satises equation (4SB). The equilibrium contract is then determined by
equation (5) and (6) with e∗ = e∗1.
● If  (eFB; ; ) ≤ 0 so that dV (e; )
de
∣e=eFB ≥ 0, then the second-best eort eSB ≥ eFB,
with an optimal contract of CSB ≥ rSB ≥ 1;
● Otherwise, eSB < eFB and 0 < CSB < rSB.
Proposition 4 is straightforward from Lemma 5 and Lemma 7. With the hump shape
objective function of e, the second-best eort level is at the unique stationary point. That
is, equation (4SB) yields only one real-value solution e∗1 in the compact interval [0; e].
Corollary 1 When  c(eFB; ; ) < 0, the equilibrium collateral is higher than the equilib-
rium interest rate (C > r ≥ 1). Thus, it induces an eort level that is higher than the
rst-best level. Therefore, when  that satises
L(eFB) ⋅ (1 − p(eFB)) − pe − (2(eFB) − 1) ⋅ eFBD′′(eFB)p < 0;
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the good borrower (with high ) is more likely to be overcollateralized (C > 1) and to exert
too much eort (compared to the rst-best level) in equilibrium.
The condition of  in Corollary 1 can be derived by taking the rst-order derivative of
 c with respect to . With this condition,  c(eFB; 1; ) <  c(eFB; 2; ) if 1 > 2. That
is, the good borrower (with higher ) has a lower NMC than the bad borrower. As a result,
the good borrower is more likely to have a negative NMC that leads to overcollateralization
and an above rst-best eort level.
Figure 6.1 describes Corollary 1 with specications of p(e; ) = e andD(e) = 1/2e2 ( >
0).5 (a) gives an example where collateral yields a net marginal benet of increasing eort
above the rst-best level ( (eFB; ; ) < 0). For any given e in the picture, the borrower
has a rational expectation of what credit contract a bank would oer in equilibrium. Thus,
the borrower knows exactly where his expected utility ends up on the curve for each choice
of eort level (as shown in (a)). There is a unique equilibrium (the red point on the right)
where the borrower's expected utility is maximized. The blue point on the left provides a
benchmark of what happen when there is shirking moral hazard and the borrower chooses
the rst-best eort level. It is lower than the second-best eort level but its corresponding
expected utility is also lower, so it is not an equilibrium when there is shirking.
In picture (b), I show that the case in picture (a) is more likely to happen to a good-type















Figure 6.1: Corollary 1
5The parameter set that I use to simulate Figure 6.1 is: L = 4:5,  = 5,  = 0:7, G = 1, B = 0:8, and
a = a = 1.
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bad-type borrower is more likely to end up in the smaller hump shape below with an
opposite situation: the equilibrium eort level is below the rst-best.
Corollary 2 In the second-best equilibrium, banks always use positive collateral. Higher
collateral induces higher eort level.
Under shirking moral hazard, if there is no collateral, the borrower tends to exert an
eort level that is lower than the rst-best because eort is costly. (ICe) constraint implies
that higher collateral induces higher eort level. Therefore, in equilibrium, it is optimal
for a bank to require positive collateral to encourage a higher eort level. This result is
dierent from that in Boot, Thakor, and Udell (1991) where the equilibrium contract for the
good borrower is unsecured when there is shirking. In their model, the good-type borrower
exerts a rst-best eort level even when there is shirking because they impose an exogenous
boundary on the choices of available eort levels. Thus, the \rst-best" eort level in their
model is in fact the relatively better choice of the two choices that are available to the
borrower, but not the \true" rst-best eort level within the choices of a continuum of
eort level. In other words, their results are corner solutions in my model when choices of
eort level are bounded.6
Corollary 3 In the second-best equilibrium, all the ineciencies come from the assumption
of costly collateral ( < 1). A lower cost of collateral (high ) improves social eciency,
but the relation between  and eort (or collateral) is not monotonic.
In their Proposition 3, Boot, Thakor, and Udell (1991) claim that an increase in 
reduces the collateral requirement for the bad borrower.7 This is consistent with Lemma 6
when the rst-best eort level is achieved with a specic set of parameters. Unlike Boot,
Thakor, and Udell (1991), with an endogenously determined second-best eort level in my
model, the relation between  and collateral is not always monotonic.
6Although I do not include my results here, I also extend my model to the cases when eort level has a
lower bound and (or) a upper bound. In those cases, the rst-best equilibrium can sometimes be achieved
when the borrower has a very high productivity. This extension can explain Boot, Thakor, and Udell (1991)'s
results. In addition, when the borrower's productivity is very low, collateral sometimes might not be eective
enough to encourage eort and zero collateral is used under second best.
7In their model, they assume the borrower's eort level is bounded so that the good borrower gets the
rst-best contract and exerts rst-best eort even with shirking moral hazard. Although the bad borrower
is oered a secured contract instead under the second-best, he still choose a rst-best eort level due to the
assumption of limited choices of eort level.
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The economic intuition of Corollary 3 is as follows. If collateral is costless ( = 1), full
collateral is always used.8 In this case, collateral provides a punishment mechanism for a
bank to eliminate the limited-liability rents. With C = r = 1, the borrower pays 1 no matter
what and collateral provides enough incentive to induce a rst-best eort level. Therefore,
moral hazard is no longer an issue and costless collateral imposes no ineciency.
However, in this thesis, I assume that collateral is costly. This assumption of  < 1
has two eects. The rst eect is to weaken the eectiveness of collateral as a punishment
mechanism to induce a higher eort level in order to reduce the limited-liability rents. As
a consequence, a higher collateral level might be used to reduce the ineciency from the
limited-liability rents. But because collateral is itself costly, higher collateral also introduces
extra ineciency. In addition,  < 1 has an indirect eect to induce higher eort because
the borrower knows that if the project fails, he is the one who bears the cost of collateral. In
summary, given  < 1, banks and the borrower face a trade-o between reducing ineciency
from the limited-liability rents and reducing ineciency from the cost of collateral itself.
Clearly, from (2′e), a higher  leads to a higher borrower value and thus introduces less
ineciency.9 However, because collateral can reduce the limited-liability rents but is costly,
a lower collateral level does not necessarily improve eciency. Thus, the relation between
 and equilibrium collateral might not be monotonic. Because of the monotonic relation
between eort and collateral, we can obtain the same non-monotonic relation between 
and the equilibrium eort level.
An alternative way to demonstrate Corollary 3 is to consider the trade-o between
MCE and MBE. Because a larger  decreases MBE and MCE at the same time, it is not
clear ex-ante which marginal eect dominates in determining the optimal eort level and
collateral level.
In Figure 6.2, I show how the equilibrium eort level e, collateral C, interest rate r and
borrower's value V change with . I use the same example as in Figure 6.1. Picture (a)
is corresponding to Figure 6.1(a), and (b) is to the lower hump shape in Figure 6.1(b).
In picture (a), the equilibrium eort and collateral both decrease with , where as in
picture (b), they both increase with . In both pictures, the borrower's value increases as
8Chan and Thakor (1987) also discuss this case in their model.
9(2′e) can be rewritten as V (e; ) = eD′(e) −D(e) − 1 − e(L −D′(e))















(b)  (eFB ; ; ) > 0
Figure 6.2: Corollary 3
 increases, because a lower cost of collateral improves social welfare.
6.2 Pure Monopoly with Shirking
In this subsection, the second-best equilibrium in a monopolistic credit market with
shirking moral hazard is considered. When a bank has monopoly power, his program
generates credit contracts that maximize his expected prot subject to the two constraints(IR) and (IRV ) and an incentive constraint of eort. That is:
max
C;r
(C; r; e∗; ) = p∗ ⋅ r + (1 − p∗) ⋅ C − 1; (1′)
subject to (IR); (IRV ) and (ICe):
In this case, it is the (IRV ) constraint that always binds. Now that the bank has market
power, it maximizes its prots and get the entire total surplus. That means the borrower
gets a zero utility in equilibrium, which is just enough to get him to sign the credit contract.
Following the same method as in Section 6.1, I solve the principal's program in the pure
monopoly case. With (ICe) and the binding (IRV ), there is a one-to-one mapping from
the optimal eort level e∗i to C∗i and to r∗i . Therefore, the equilibrium contract (C∗; r∗)
can be rewritten as:
C∗ = e∗D′(e∗) −D(e∗); (5′)
r∗ = e∗L − (1 − p∗) ⋅ e∗D′(e∗) − p∗ ⋅D(e∗)
p∗ = C∗ + e∗(L −D′(e∗))p∗ : (6′)
Similarly, the principal's program is reduced to a function of e:
max
e
(e; ) = eL − 1 − (1 − (e)) ⋅ eD′(e) − (e)D(e); (1′e)
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= L −D′(e) + (1 − )pe ⋅ [eD′(e) −D(e)] − (1 − (e)) ⋅ eD′′(e): (FOCm)
d2(e; )
de2
= −[2(1 + ) − 3(e)] ⋅D′′(e) − (1 − (e)) ⋅ eD′′′(e): (SOCm)
With (FOCm) and (SOCm), it can be shown that Lemma 4 and Lemma 5 still hold




≤  < 1. Again, I focus on the solutions from the \rst-order approach" in Lemma 5
and rewrite equation (FOCm) as:
L =D′(eSB) +  m(eSB; ; ); (4′SB)
where
 m(eSB ∣; ) = (1−(eSB)) ⋅ eSBD′′(eSB)− (1− )pe ⋅ [eSBD′(eSB)−D(eSB)]: (NMCm)
Lemma 8 In pure monopoly with shirking only, the rst-best eort level is achieved if and
only if  m(eFB; ; ) = 0. And in this case, CSB = rSB = eFBL −D(eFB) ≥ 1
(eFB) .
The reasoning is again similar to that in Section 6.1. Hence, Lemma 8 is similar to
Lemma 6 but with a dierent formula of NMC. Proposition 4 is also similar under pure
monopoly but with (NMCm) instead of (NMCc). Chan and Thakor (1987) show that
higher collateral induces higher eort level under pure monopoly with  = 1. My model
extends their results to the cases when collateral is costly.
Lemma 9 With the same set of parameters, in order to induce a given eort level, higher
collateral is needed under pure monopoly than under perfect competition.
Lemma 9 can be derived by the equilibrium results of collateral under the two notions
of competition with (IRV ) or (IR). Equation (5) and (5′) suggest that for the same e,
C∗m−C∗c = S∗c ≥ 0. Therefore, to induce a given eort level, higher collateral is needed under
pure monopoly than under perfect competition.
Lemma 10 With the same set of parameters, the second-best equilibrium eort level under
pure monopoly is greater than that under perfect competition.
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Lemma 10 can be derived by comparing (FOCm) to (FOCc). Suppose e∗m is the second-
best eort level under pure monopoly such that (FOCm) = 0. I can show that with e = e∗m,(FOCc) = (1 − )pe(e∗m) ⋅ (C∗c (e∗m) −C∗m(e∗m)) < 0 (see Lemma 9). Therefore, in order to
get (FOCc) = 0, the second-best eort level under perfect competition e∗c must be lower
than e∗m.
Proposition 5 In a credit market under shirking moral hazard, all else equal, competition
improves market eciency.
From equation (3) in Section 3, the total surplus in perfect competition is given by:
S∗c = 1∗c [e∗cL − 1 − (1 − ∗c ) ⋅ e∗cD′(e∗c )] −D(e∗c ):
Whereas the total surplus in pure monopoly is given by:
S∗m = e∗mL − 1 − (1 − ∗m) ⋅ e∗mD′(e∗m) − ∗mD(e∗m):
When  = 1 so that ∗ = 1, the rst-best eort level can be achieved under both market
structures so that both equilibria yield the same total surplus. In this case, monopoly power
does not matter to social welfare. However, when collateral is costly ( < 1), with the same
e∗m, S∗m(e∗m) = (e∗m) ⋅S∗c (e∗m) < S∗c (e∗m). In addition, because e∗c maximizes Sc, we also have
S∗c (e∗m) < S∗c (e∗c ). Therefore, S∗m(e∗m) < S∗c (e∗c ) and competition improves market eciency.
Figure 6.3 illustrates Lemma 10 and Proposition 5.10 I use the same set of parameters
as in Figure 6.2(b). Under pure monopoly, the second-best eort level is higher than that
under perfect competition, but the total surplus is smaller.












Figure 6.3: Proposition 5
SECTION 7
TWO-DIMENSIONAL MORAL HAZARD
In the last two sections, I have discussed the equilibrium results with each type of moral
hazard, risk-taking and shirking, separately. In this section, I study the equilibria with
two-dimensional moral hazard in a single model. Because I do not nd any new insight in
the pure monopoly case other than what I have shown in Section 6.2, I only focus on the
perfect competition case in this section.
For tractability, I impose the following set of assumptions for this section:
Assumption 5 (A5)
a. a > a > 0 and D(a) = 0 for all a.
b. The disutility of eort function D(e) is increasing and convex in e (D′(e) > 0 and
D′′(e) ≥ 0), and D′′′(e) ≥ 0. Moreover, D′(0) = 0 and D′(e) = +∞.1
c. p(e; a; ) is linear in e with a zero intercept (so that we can write p(e; a; ) = epe(a; )).
d. p(e; a; 1) > p(e; a; 2) for any 1 > 2.
Assumption (A5) is similar to Assumption (A3) but with the risk-taking variable a.(A5b−d) are very similar to (A3b−d). In Assumption (A5a), I set D(a) to be zero for two
reasons. First, as I have shown in Section 5, by settingD(a) = 0, the model captures the pure
risk-taking eect. My main results of zero collateral and highest risk-taking in equilibrium
in Section 5 hold with or without the cost of risk-taking. Similarly here, if D(a) is small
relative to C −r (or even negative), the cost (or benet) of risk-taking is just a second-order
eect and does not aect my main results (also see the analysis of Figure 7.1).2 Second,
1This is similar to the Inada condition.
2Intuitively, a positive cost of risk-taking suggests that it is costly to nd a less risky project. Suppose
gambling in Las Vages is always a costless option, it makes sense to assume D(a) > 0. However, assuming
D(a) < 0 is equivalent to assume that the borrower is risk-averse. While both cases are interesting in practice,
in this thesis, I focus on the case D(a) = 0 to capture the pure risk-taking eect and set up a benchmark.
43
if D(a) is large enough, the equilibrium eort, risk-taking, collateral and interest rate all
change simultaneously, and it is not clear ex-ante which incentive constraint binds ((ICe) or(ICa)) in equilibrium. In order to make the model tractable, I assume D(a) = 0 to simplify
the analysis.
Faced with a credit contract (C; r), each borrower chooses a set of optimal actions e∗
and a∗ to maximize his expected utility:
{e∗; a∗} ∈ argmax
e;a
V (C; r; e; a; ) (IC)
For any given a∗, the incentive constraint of e now becomes:
L =D′(e∗) − pe(a∗; ) ⋅ (C − r): (ICe)
By assumption, risk-control a does not aect expected return of the project and has no
direct cost. In equilibrium, it yields corner solutions only (either a or a), depending on the
comparison between C and r:
a∗ = a if C < r and a∗ = a otherwise: (ICa)
Similarly, I then study the impact of the two-dimensional moral hazard in equilibrium
by solving the following program for the principal (let p∗ = p(e∗; a∗; )):
max
C;r
V (C; r; e∗; a∗; ) = e∗L − p∗ ⋅ r − (1 − p∗) ⋅C −D(e∗); (2′)
subject to (IR); (IRV ); (ICe) and (ICa)
Following the same methodology as in Section 6.1, let ∗ =  + (1 − ) ⋅ p∗, and the
equilibrium contract (C∗; r∗) remains the same as in equation (5) and (6). Therefore, the
equilibrium is as if a bank is maximizing the borrower's utility by picking an optimal set of
actions for the borrower. Let p(e) = p(e; a∗; ) and (e) = (e) =  + (1 − ) ⋅ p(e), and the
principal's program is reduced to:
max
e
V (e; a∗; ) = 1
(e) ⋅ [eL − 1 − (1 − (e)) ⋅ eD′(e)] −D(e); (2′e)
subject to a∗ = a if L <D′(e) and a∗ = a otherwise: (IC ′a)
For each optimal a∗, the rst-order and second-order derivatives of V (e; ) with respect
to e are given by:
@V (e; a∗; )
@e
= 1
2(e) ⋅ [ ⋅(L−D′(e))+(1−) ⋅pe(a∗; )−(e)(1−(e)) ⋅eD′′(e)]: (FOC)
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@2V (e; a∗; )
@e2
= − 2(1 − ) ⋅ pe(a∗; )
(e) ⋅ @V (e; a∗; )@e
− [2(1 + ) − 3(e)] ⋅D′′(e) + (1 − (e)) ⋅ eD′′′(e)
(e) :
(SOC)
In order to use the \rst-order approach" in discussing solutions of e, we also need an
additional set of assumptions that is very similar to Assumption (A4) but with a = a∗:
Assumption 6 (A6)
a. Relaxed version: For each optimal a∗, [2(1+)−3(e)] ⋅D′′(e)+(1−(e)) ⋅eD′′′(e) ≥ 0
for any e.
b. Strong version: For each optimal a∗, 1
2
≤  < 1 and D′(e) is not too large relative to
L so that we have
@2V (e; a∗; )
@e2
≤ 0 for any e.
Lemma 11 With Assumptions (A1), (A2) and (A6a), the equilibrium eort under moral
hazard must be either eFB or a solution from the \rst-order approach" (See proof in
Appendix A).
This is, again, similar to Grossman and Hart (1983)'s CDFC statement of the validity
of the \rst-order approach". However, with two possible actions a and a in equilibrium,
the objective function here does not fulll the strict concavity condition. So Lemma 11 is
also a little bit dierent from Lemma 4. With Assumption (A6a), now the maximization
problem can be solved piecewisely by dividing the objective function into two regions (when
L < D′(e) and when L ≥ D′(e)). In other words, the maximization problem remains
tractable using the \rst-order approach" with an extra step to compare several potential
equilibria. In fact, with the stronger assumption (A6b) (it is exactly the same as (A4b)),
the objective function is a hump shape (or a part of the hump shape) in each region, so
that we have Lemma 12.
Lemma 12 With Assumptions (A1), (A2) and (A6b), there are at most two potential
solutions of e under moral hazard: the smaller one satises (FOC) = 0 with a = a, and the
larger one is either eFB (if with e = eFB and a = a, (FOC) < 0) or the one that satises(FOC) = 0 with a = a (See proof in Appendix A).
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Again, I focus on the solutions from the \rst-order approach" in Lemma 12 and rewrite
equation (FOC) as:
L =D′(eSB) +  (eSB; aSB; ; ); (4SB)
where
 (eSB; aSB; ; ) = 1

[(eSB)(1 − (eSB)) ⋅ eSBD′′(eSB) − (1 − ) ⋅ pe(aSB; )]: (NMC)
Similarly, there are two components in (NMC): MCE and MBE. Whether the net eect
is benet or cost now depends on the interaction among dierent frictions: cost of eort
(shirking, e), limited liability (risk-taking, a), and cost of collateral (), given borrower's
quality type (). Therefore, Lemma 7 still holds with a = a∗. With two potential a∗ in
equilibrium, we have Proposition 6.
Proposition 6 In a competitive equilibrium under two-dimensional moral hazard (shirking
and risk-taking: a > a), there are three potential equilibria:
(Equilibrium 1:) aSB = a, and eSB = e∗2 that satises equation (4SB) with a = a.
In this case, eSB < eFB and 0 < CSB < rSB.
(Equilibrium 2:) aSB = a, and eSB = eFB if (FOC) < 0 with e = eFB and a∗ = a.
In this case, CSB = rSB ≥ 1
(eFB) .
(Equilibrium 3:) aSB = a, and eSB = e∗2 that satises equation (4SB) with a = a.
In this case, eSB ≥ eFB and CSB ≥ rSB ≥ 1.
Which equilibrium dominates depends on which one yields the highest V (eSB; aSB; ) based
on equation (2′e). The equilibrium contract is then determined by equation (5) and (6).
Proposition 6 can also be derived from Lemma 12. It considers risk-taking moral hazard
as well as shirking by allowing a > a. In this case, the objective function (2′e) consists of two
hump shapes (the one on the right might be only the right part of a hump shape). Thus,
there are only two peak values of e that lead to two potential equilibria: one is Equilibrium
1 in Proposition 6, and the other is either Equilibrium 2 or Equilibrium 3. One of them
usually yields a higher value for the borrower than the other and is the real equilibrium.
However, in a special case where the two equilibria yield the same value for the borrower,
two equilibria can both exist.
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Figure 7.1 gives examples of the three equilibria that are described in Proposition 6.3 In(a), collateral yields a net marginal cost of increasing eort ( (eSB; a; ; ) > 0) so that the
second-best eort level is lower than the rst-best eort level. In this case, a bank chooses
to use a lower level of collateral (CSB < rSB) because collateral is not very eective and the
borrower always takes the most risk (aSB = a).
Picture (b) is the case when risk-taking has a large impact on the project. In this case,
the rst-best eort level can be achieved. Collateral is also very eective so that a bank uses
collateral the same rate as interest rate at 1/(eFB). As a result, collateral also has a side
eect on controlling risk-taking and the borrower chooses the lowest risk-taking (aSB = a)
in equilibrium.
Picture (c) is quite similar to Figure 6.1 but with a > a > 0. In this case, collateral yields
a net marginal benet of increasing eort ( (eSB; a; ; ) < 0) so that the second-best eort
level is higher than the rst-best eort level. Therefore, collateral is more eective than
that in (a) and a bank chooses to use higher collateral (CSB > rSB). Again, as a side eect,
higher collateral also induces the lowest risk-taking of borrower in equilibrium.
The discontinuity points in each picture are due to the extreme choices of risk-taking
a. These points happen to be at e = eFB because I set D(a) = 0 (see equation (IC ′a)).
However, if the cost of risk-taking is large enough, there are several second-order eects.












(c) eSB > eFB and aSB = a
Figure 7.1: Proposition 6
3The parameter sets that I use to simulate these pictures are as follows. For (a): L = 5,  = 5,  = 0:7,
 = 0:7, a = 1, and a = 0:95; for (b): L = 4:5,  = 5,  = 0:7,  = 0:8, a = 1, and a = 0:5; for (c): L = 4:5,  = 5,
 = 0:7,  = 1, a = 1, and a = 0:5.
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collateral is needed to switch the borrower's choice of risk-taking. However, collateral is
still a side eect because a low a is still chosen when the collateral rate is lower than the
interest rate, as shown on the left part of the picture. Second, the borrower value at each
point is lower than before because of the cost of risk-taking. Last but not least, the gap
in value at each discontinuity point is smaller. In fact, when the cost of risk-taking is very
large so that the gap becomes negative, the borrower always chooses the highest risk-taking
in equilibrium no matter how much collateral is pledged.
Corollary 4 In equilibrium, collateral is used by banks only to encourage higher eort but
not for the purpose of inhibiting risk-taking. But when a bank uses high collateral (C > r ≥ 1),
collateral has a side eect on lowering risk-taking.
Corollary 4 is straight forward in Equilibrium 1 where 0 < CSB < rSB, because the bor-
rower chooses aSB = a even with a positive collateral level. In Equilibrium 2 or Equilibrium
3 where CSB ≥ rSB ≥ 1, although the borrower chooses less risk-taking (aSB = a), it is
only a side eect of collateral that is due to the positive impact of lower risk-taking on the
eectiveness of collateral in encouraging higher eort. (4SB) implies that, with 1
2
≤  < 1,
lower risk-taking leads to a lower MCE and a higher MBE, all else equal. That is, lower
risk-taking increases the marginal eect of increasing eort. Therefore, it strengthens the
function of collateral on encouraging higher eort.
However, lower risk-taking also make collateral more eective through ∗, which in
turn decreases the borrower's value (see equation (2′e)). Therefore, it is not clear, ex-ante,
whether banks choose to use higher collateral (CSB ≥ rSB ≥ 1). In equilibrium, either
equilibrium in Proposition 6 might exist depending on dierent sets of parameters.
SECTION 8
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
In this thesis, I re-examine the incentive function of collateral in a credit contract with
dierent market frictions, including costly eort (shirking), limited liability (risk-taking),
costly collateral, imperfect competition, and adverse selection. I show that when collateral
is costly, the optimal level of collateral in equilibrium depends on the interactions of
these market frictions. Particularly, banks use collateral to encourage higher eort from
borrowers. However, the cost of collateral might bring ineciency to both the second-best
eort level and collateral level. As a result, when collateral is more eective in reducing
limited-liability rents and in inducing higher eort, higher collateral (than the equilibrium
interest rate) is used in equilibrium which leads to an eort level that is above the rst-best.
In this case, collateral also has a side eect of inhibiting risk-taking. However, when
collateral is not as eective, lower collateral level (than the equilibrium interest rate) is
used in equilibrium with an eort level that is below the rst-best and collateral has no
impact on risk-taking. This is a surprising result compared to conventional wisdom.
In Section 8.1, I discuss how my model can help explain the mixed results in the empirical
studies. In addition, I show that while the interaction of adverse selection and competition
reduces social eciency, the interaction of shirking moral hazard and competition might
improve social eciency. These opposite predictions deserve further investigations.
In Section 8.2, I propose two testable hypotheses for future empirical research.
Finally, in Section 8.3, I discuss a few limitations of the model, and then propose
potential extensions for future research in theory.
8.1 Empirical Implications
The rst empirical implication is regarding the relation between the amount of collateral
and borrower's type. Existing theories carefully elaborate their predictions based on certain
assumptions. However, some empirical papers interpret these predictions dierently and
present contradicted results. For example, Boot, Thakor, and Udell (1991) gives a simple
example with only two choices of eort levels and predicts an equilibrium with secured
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bad-type and unsecured good-type contracts. But at the end of their paper, they also
emphasize that this result is based on the assumptions that eort and quality are substitutes
and that the moral hazard problem is moderate. They even state explicitly that if the rst
assumption changes that eort and quality are complementaries, the results may be exactly
the opposite. However, Jimenez, Salas, and Saurina (2006) cite Boot, Thakor, and Udell
(1991) to develop their Hypothesis 1 directly without controlling for these two assumptions.
In addition, they use a dummy variable as a proxy for collateral, whereas the economic
intuition of collateral in the model is the ratio of the collateral amount over loan size. They
then present a positive relation between the collateral dummy and the borrower's credit
quality and attribute it to the screening function of collateral under adverse selection.
Steijvers and Voordeckers (2009) review empirical research on the function of collateral
and add that other papers (e.g., Chakraborty and Hu (2006)) nd an opposite relation
to that in Jimenez, Salas, and Saurina (2006) and explain it with the incentive function
of collateral to mitigate the moral hazard problem. This is consistent with conventional
wisdom that the bad-type borrowers have higher risk than the good-types so that a bank
requires higher collateral from the bad-types to control their risks. In contrast, I show that
whether a borrower pledges a higher or lower collateral level depends on more than one
conditions. My model implies that, in order to retrieve the real relation between collateral
amount and borrower's quality type, one needs to control for dierent frictions. For example,
as I have shown in Proposition 4, how much collateral to pledge in equilibrium depends on
not only the borrower's quality type () but also other factors such as the complementary
or substitutable relation between eort and quality in determining default risk and the cost
of collateral ().1 That is, at least two more variables should be included in the empirical
test: the cost of collateral, and the interaction between eort and quality in determining
default risk.2
Another empirical implication is about the proxy for risk. Boot, Thakor, and Udell
(1991) has a discussion of the two measures of risk: default risk and project variance.
1Empirically,  can be aected by many factors. For example, a better lending relationship might reduce
information asymmetry of the borrower's assets and enable banks to pick an asset for collateral with a higher
 (e.g., Harho and Korting (1998), Steijvers and Voordeckers (2009)).
2For example, one way to control for the interaction between eort and quality empirically is to add
in an industry xed eect: In an industry where quality has a large impact on controlling risk-taking (like
manufacture rms), it is more likely to be a complementary relation; whereas in an industry where risk-taking
is almost irrelevant to rm quality (like pharmaceutical companies), it might be a substitute relation or no
relation.
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However, they do not provide a clear link between dierent variables in the model and the
empirical proxies. Existing theories do not have a consistent presentation of risk in the
models of credit contracts. For example, Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) use the same variable
 for type as well as for risk.3 In their model, the borrower's type is reected by the
average risk of their project with a Mean-Preserving-Spread (MPS) technology. In Chan
and Thakor (1987) and in Boot, Thakor, and Udell (1991), whether type  and eort e
are monotonously related to risk depends on which risk measure to use. A higher  or
(and) a higher e reduce default risk in a First-order-Stochastic-Dominance (FSD) sense
so that their impacts on project variance depend on how bad the borrower is and how
severe the shirking problem is. Additionally, the equilibrium default risk is determined
not only by the borrower's quality type but also by the equilibrium eort level that is
endogenously determined. However, because Boot, Thakor, and Udell (1991) assume that
eort and quality are substitutes, the equilibrium default risk might not move in the same
direction as does borrower type. Consequently, as Jimenez, Salas, and Saurina (2006) test
the relation between credit quality (as a proxy for default risk) and collateral dummy in
their Hypothesis 1, they do not precisely test the prediction of Boot, Thakor, and Udell
(1991). In addition, other papers (e.g., Berger and Udell (1995), John, Lynch, and Puri
(2003)) use loan interest rate as a proxy for borrower risk which makes the literature even
more confusing.4 Therefore, in order to construct a precise hypothesis, more theoretical
guidance is needed.
This thesis also contributes to the literature by dening an unambiguous variable of
risk and establish a clear link between variables in the model and the empirical proxies. I
create a separate risk-control variable a. As I show in Table 8.1, all else equal, a lower a
implies a higher risk-taking, no matter whether it is measured by default risk or project
variance. Moreover, I assume that actions (both eort e and risk-control a) and type are
complementary. In equilibrium, if collateral is moderately costly, a good-type borrower
exerts a high eort level and take a high action so that type and equilibrium default risk
3Berger and Udell (1990) also do not distinguish between borrower type and loan risk. In fact, they use
credit risk as a proxy for loan risk.
4Berger and Udell (1990) use excess loan rates as a proxy for loan risk. Whereas Petersen and Rajan
(1995) use loan rate as a proxy for a bank's monopoly power. Berger and Udell (1995) use loan rate as
a proxy for borrower risk and show that it has no statistical signicant relation with collateral. However,
John, Lynch, and Puri (2003) nd a positive relation and attribute it to the imperfection in the credit rating
process and the eect of collateral on the agency cost of equity (manager's perk consumption), which are
not considered in my model. They do control for credit rating but not for the cost of collateral.
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Table 8.1: Models of the Two-Dimensional Moral Hazard
Models Shirking (e) Risk-taking (a) Both (e and a)
~R Technology FSD of e MPS of a both







Failure: 0 with prob. 1 − e 0 with prob. 1 − a 0 with prob. 1 − ea





− ) (eL)2( 1
ea
− )
Action aects: Mainly on E( ~R) Only on V ar( ~R) both
Reasons Costs of eorts Limited liability both
First-Best L =D′(eFB) e = 1 L =D′(eFB)
a = 1 aFB = a (D(a) > 0) aFB = any value
(D(a) = 0)
CFB = 0 CFB = 0 CFB = 0
Second-Best L =D′(eSB) +  (eSB) e = 1 L =D′(eSB)
+ (eSB; aSB)
a = 1 aSB = a aSB = a or aSB = a
CSB > 0 CSB = 0 CSB > 0
If   > 0: eSB < eFB eSB < eFB
aSB = a
CSB < rSB CSB < rSB
If   ≤ 0: eSB ≥ eFB eSB ≥ eFB
aSB = a
CSB ≥ rSB ≥ 1 CSB ≥ rSB ≥ 1
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move in the same direction. This prediction is now testable using a similar setting as in
Jimenez, Salas, and Saurina (2006) after controlling for the cost of collateral. Of course,
to be more precise, we should use the ratio of collateral amount to loan size instead of a
collateral dummy.
8.2 Testable Hypotheses
As shown in equation (5) in Section 6, the equilibrium collateral level is aected by eort
(e), the marginal benet of eort (L−D′(e∗)) and the expected value ratio of collateral to
the bank (∗). I use the borrower's average protability (E( ~R) −D(e)) as a proxy of the
product of eort and the marginal benet of eort. ∗ is determined by both default risk
(1 − p∗) and cost of collateral ().
In Table 8.2, I summarize the variables in my model into two categories: unobservable
and observable variables.
In the following, I develop two testable hypotheses based on my model of two-dimensional
moral hazard. My model implies that collateral is determined by several characteristics of
the borrower, including the borrower's quality type , his marginal productivity L, his
marginal costs of eort D′(e), and the social costs of collateral . Taking all of these into
account, I construct an empirical model on the use of collateral as follows:
Table 8.2: A Summary of Model Variables
Unobservable Variable Observable Variable
 Borrower's type 1 − p(e; a; ) Default risk
e Borrower's eort C Collateral amount over loan size
a Borrower's action r Gross interest rate
to control risk 1 −  Cost of collateral
(Firm-specic assets: more costly)
E( ~R) −D(e) Protability
V ar( ~R) Volatility
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C = F (b0 + b1 ⋅Default Risk + b2 ⋅ Profit R+b3 ⋅ IC≥r × Ifirm−specific + b′3 ⋅ Ifirm−specific+b4 ⋅ Iindustry +Other Control Variables); (8.1)
where C is collateral amount over loan size, r is the gross interest rate, Default Risk is the
probability that the project fails (the proxy of which can be the borrower's credit rating),
and Profit R is the borrower's historical average prot over rm size. There are also three
dummy variables in the formula. IC≥r equals to 1 when C ≥ r. Ifirm−specific equals to 1 when
the collateral is the borrower's rm-specic assets (I use the classication of rm-specic
assets as in Liberti and Mian (2010)). Iindustry is used to control for industry xed eects.
Now I present two hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1 The use of collateral increases with the borrower's default risk (b1 > 0), and
decreases with the borrower's protability (b2 < 0).
Hypothesis 2 When C is no lower than r, a higher level of collateral is used when collateral
is a rm-specic asset than when collateral is a non-rm-specic asset (b3 + b′3 > 0); When
C is lower than r, a lower level of collateral is used when collateral is a rm-specic asset
than when collateral is a non-rm-specic asset (b′3 < 0).
When the collateral is rm-specic, it is more likely to have a higher liquidation cost
and thus implies a higher social cost of collateral. According to my model, a higher social
cost of collateral leads to a lower level of collateral when C < r.
8.3 Limitations and Future Work
In the following, I discuss a few limitations of my model and propose future research
directions.
First of all, I make some assumptions in my model in order to insure interior solutions of
eort e. However, the range of eort choices might be bounded in practice. It can be shown
that under certain boundaries of eort levels, zero collateral and the rst-best eort level
might sometimes be optimal in equilibrium. Boot, Thakor, and Udell (1991) is one extreme
example. This implication oers a good explanation for the empirical fact that about 30%
of the U.S. loans are unsecured. Boot, Thakor, and Udell (1991) also mention that the
zero-collateral (for the good-type borrower) equilibrium can happen when the good-type
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borrower is more likely to default given that the borrowers choose their respective rst-best
actions.
Second, the case with a continuum of types should be non-trivial and deserve our further
investigation given the contradicting conclusions in prior literature. Rothschild and Stiglitz
(1976) discuss in their Footnote 7 about the non-existence of equilibrium due to the benet
of pooling.5 However, Chan and Thakor (1987) argue that \the results with a continuum
of types are mostly similar to those obtained here" (either for separating or for pooling).
It is interesting to investigate the reason of this dierence. Could it be attributed to the
introduction of the moral hazard eects? In addition, the model in Chan and Thakor (1987)
allows only two choices of actions for each borrower. In a simple model with only two types
of borrowers, two choices of actions might be perfect to capture the two extreme cases.
However, with a continuum of types, the limited choices of actions might rule out a large
variety of contract set and lead to very dierent equilibria. Could that be the reason why
Chan and Thakor (1987) nd similar results with a continuum of types to those with only
two types?
Third, with more than one banks in the credit market, the possibility of collusion when
they interact repeatedly might lead to interesting results, especially when we consider the
dierent kinds of equilibria: separating or pooling. For example, which type of contract
is most conducive to collusion in equilibrium? Boot and Thakor (1994) have oered a
dynamic model under shirking moral hazard. But a dynamic model with two-dimensional
moral hazard and adverse selection is still an open question.
Fourth, most of the papers I cited here also discuss the possibility and impacts of credit
rationing (e.g., Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), Wette (1983), Bester (1985), Stiglitz and Weiss
(1986), Besanko and Thakor (1987a), Clemenz (1993), Besanko and Thakor (1993)), for it is
an important dimension in a credit contract that generates a stream of literature. To avoid
the credit-rationing problem and to focus on the incentive mechanism of collateral, I assume
that banks have unlimited loan supplies and the borrower has unlimited access to collateral.
5They claim that when there are relatively few low-types in the market, the principal might have incentive
to deviate from a separating equilibrium to a pooling equilibrium for more prots. But similar to I have
showed in Section 5.1.3, the pooling equilibrium is not sustainable. So in this case, no equilibrium exists. Not
until recently does Guerrieri, Shimer, and Wright (2010) show that since rms can match with at most one
worker, such a deviation cannot serve the entire population so that equilibrium always exists. An extension
for the credit contract under asymmetric information is to compare the separating and pooling equilibrium,
also taking into consideration the moral hazard eect and imperfect competition, and discuss whether both
equilibria are sustainable and if so, which one is more ecient.
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I argue that when risk-taking moral hazard is the only friction, the borrower provides
zero collateral anyway even if these assumptions are relaxed. That is, the credit-rationing
problem is just a second-order eect in this case. But when we also consider adverse
selection, ex-ante, it is not clear to which direction credit rationing leads us.
Fifth, Besanko and Thakor (1987b) argue that variable loan size rules out credit rationing
in some cases. Indeed, loan size can be another contract dimension to be included in my
model. It could be a fruitful research direction to pursue implications in capital structure
and other corporate governance issues. For example, the trade-o theorem of capital
structure is closely related to the agency costs of debt that is due to risk-taking moral
hazard.6 Whereas the pecking-order theorem is closely related to the adverse selection
problem. An extended model with optimal loan size might also inspire new thinkings in the
debate of the capital structure puzzle.
However, one caveat is that because what I focus here is the optimal contract, I assume
that a lot of rm characteristics are exogenously given. Nevertheless, the capital structure
is determined simultaneously with other corporate decisions. For example,  is a constant
parameter in my model. But from the borrower's perspective, it can be aected by mon-
itoring, capital market environment, borrower's incentive to maintain the assets that are
used as collateral and so on. That is,  might interact with other corporate governance
variables (e.g., Leeth and Scott (1989), Gan (2007)) such as capital structure (e.g., James
H. Scott (1977), Smith and Warner (1979)).7 Therefore, conclusions need to be made with
extra cautions.
Last but not least, in this thesis, I only consider the case when the borrower chooses a
single investment project. In this case, risk-taking moral hazard is a simple version of the
over-investment problem. However, the underinvestment problem is not considered because
I assume a large enough L to insure contract and thus investment. If multiple investment
projects are allowed, the underinvestment problem can be another type of moral hazard in
addition to the over-investment problem (e.g., Stulz and Johnson (1985), Flannery, Houston,
and Venkataraman (1993)).
6In their well-known session of \agency costs of debt", Jensen and Meckling (1976) also describe risk-
taking moral hazard in two examples: one with the \same expected total payo" that is similar to my
Section 5 and the other with negative NPV project that is similar to my Section 7.
7Roberts and Su (2009) nd that rms with higher debt capacity and better nancing sources are less
likely to have an increased collateral requirement after a violation of debt covenant. Other papers that are
related to capital structure and collateral include Morellec (2001) and Rauh and Su (1995).
APPENDIX
PROOFS
A.1 Proofs for Section 5
A.1.1 Robustness: Technology of Project Return





0 with probability 1 − aii
This MPS technology is distinct from prior literature mainly in the eects of type and
action on the two major properties of the project's return: expected return and risk.
Using FSD technique, Chan and Thakor (1987) assume that type and eort together
can aect both properties of the project's return. Whereas with MSP technique, risk is
aected by both type and action but expected return is solely determined by type. I
choose this technology so that I am able to isolate the risk-taking eect from the shirking
eect. However, it is interesting to investigate an even more fundamental case where risk
is solely determined by action while expected return is solely determined by type. This
intuitively simpler case in fact requires a more complicated model. In the following, by
reverse-engineering a prevalent risk-return expression in asset pricing1, I show that my
results are still robust with the new assumption.
In fact, the two-outcome expression above is a special case of the following ~R:
~Ri = Li + ~i, where E(~i) = 0 and V ar(~i) = Li ⋅ L
ai
⋅ (1 − aii):
With the new assumption, the variance then becomes V ar(~i) = 1
ai
. To make is tractable
in my model, we do reverse-engineering and turn it back to the zero-in-failure two-outcome
case as follows:












With the new assumption, the expressions of Vi and i remain the same as before with
the new term 1 − 1
aiL22i
in replacement of aii. I have checked each step of the analysis
in Section 5 and conrm that the new expression of probability of success does not aect
the shapes or positions of the lines in any gure qualitatively. Because the key properties
in my analysis that are related to this change are all about the slopes of indierence curves
and those of zero-prot lines, and what matter to these slopes are their rst-order partial
derivatives with respect to type and to action. All else equal, either a higher ai or a higher
i would make the slopes atter no matter which expression we use of the probability of
success. Therefore, all my results are robust with the new assumption that only action, but
not type, aects project risk.
A.1.2 Proof of Lemma 3: Existence of Separating Equilibrium
In the following, I rst derive the condition of  that rules out alternative pooling
equilibria, and then derive the condition  that rules out alternative separating equilibria.
Condition of  to Rule Out Alternative Pooling: In Figure 5.4 of Section 5.1.3,
the (green) dash-dot lines are the market odds lines (CP ; rP ; ) = 0 for a pooling contract
with dierent s. A larger  moves the market odds line upper and steeper. Because
B ≤  ≤ G and the slope of the market odds line is −(1 − a)
a
, the market odds lines
cross the good-type's zero-prot line at the point r = C < C. That is, in the feasible region
where C < 1 ≤ r, the market odds lines never cross the good-type borrower's zero-prot
line at any point to the left of G. Therefore, with a large enough , the market odds line
has an interception on r above G1. That is, the market odds line lies above the good-type
borrower's indierence curve, the line G1G
2 which G lies on. As a result, any pooling
contract P ′ that is preferred by both types of borrowers makes a negative prot and would
not upset the existent separating equilibrium.
2For some large , the slope of the market odds line might sometimes be even steeper than the good-type
borrower's indierence curve that G lies on. However, this case only happens when the interception of the
market odds line on r is below G1, otherwise the market odds line would cross the good-type borrower's
zero-prot line at a point that is on the left to G.
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In order to nd out the critical value for , I calculate the contract at G1, and then use
the zero-prot condition for pooling contract and zero collateral to get rP . rP that should
be above G1. First, because the indierence curve G1G yields a utility of
VG = lG − 1 − (1 − )(1 − aG)(G − B)
G − B[ + (1 − )aG] − 12ca2
as shown in equation (5), at the interception on r with CG1 = 0, we have:
rG1 = 1aG ⋅ (1 − )(1 − aG)G + (G − B)G − B[ + (1 − )aG] :
Second, with (0; rP ; ) = 0, we have rP = 1
a
. Finally, because the market odds line with
 lies above G1G, or rP > rG1 , we have:
 > (1 − )(1 − aG)G(1 − )(1 − aG)G + G − B :
Condition of  to Rule Out Alternative Separating: In Section 5.1.3, I have
explained that subsidy story. If on average, a bank can make a non-negative prot from it,
the alternative set of contracts B′ and G′ as shown in Figure 5.4 might upset the existing
separating contracts. In this proof, I demonstrate in details how a large enough  can rule
out this possibility.
First of all, Section 5.1.1 has shown that zero collateral is always optimal for the bad-type
borrower and thus B′ must also be on the r axis. Second, for B′ and G′ to upset the existing
separating equilibrium, H ′ must fulll the following conditions: (1) G′ lies above the bad-
type borrower's indierence curve (the one that passes B′) so that the bad-type borrower
does not mimic the good-type; (2) G′ lies below the good-type borrower's indierence curve
G1G so that both types of borrowers are better o; (3) The average prot from B
′ and G′
is non-negative.
Because B′ lies below the bad-type borrower's zero-prot line, it makes a negative prot
for a bank. In order to subsidize the loss with the good-type contract G′, G′ must lie
above the good-type borrower's zero-prot line G0G. Conditions (1) and (2) imply that
any potential contract G′ is restricted in the small triangle that is formed by the bad-type
borrower's indierence curve (the one that passes B′), the good-type's indierence curve
G1G and the zero-prot line G0G. Mathematically, we have:
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⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
V (CG′; rG′; B; a) ≤ V (0; rB ′; B; a) or rB ′ − rG′
CG
′ ≤ 1 − aBaB
V (CG′; rG′; G; a) ≥ V (CG; rG; G; a) or rG′ − rG
CG −CG′ ≤ 1 − aGaG
(0; rB ′; B; a) + (1 − )(CG′; rG′; G; a) ≥ 0
or aBrB
′ + (1 − )[aGrG′ + (1 − aG)CG′] ≥ 1
where
CG = G − B
G − B[ + (1 − )aG] and rG = G + (1 − )
1
a − B
G − B[ + (1 − )aG] :
To nd the critical value of 0 that on average makes a zero prot for a bank, I solve
the set of simultaneous equations above with each constraint binding (by treating rB
′ as
known, we have three equations and three unknown variables: rG
′, CG′ and ). The result
is:
0 = (1 − )(1 − aG)G(1 − )(1 − aG)G + G − B :
This result suggests that rB
′ is cancelled out in the calculation. Thus, the expression of
0 is exactly the same as the critical value of  in condition (1) that rules out alternative
pooling. With any  > 0, the losses from the bad-type contracts are larger with more
bad-type contracts so that banks make negative prots on average. Therefore, as long as
 > 0, there is no alternative separating contract set that would upset the equilibrium
contracts B and G.
A.2 Proofs for Section 7
A.2.1 Proof of Lemma 4:
In this maximization problem of e, what matters to the properties of the solutions
is the concavity of V (e; ). It is determined by the second-order derivative. As long as
d2V (e; )
de2
≤ 0 for any e such that dV (e; )
de
≥ 0 and V (e; ) is a continuous function of e,





For (1), because dV (e; )
de
∣e=0 > 0, we can rule out the corner solution at e = 0. And with
D′(e) = +∞ in Assumption (A2b), dV (e; )
de
∣e=e < 0, so we can also rule out e = e. So we can
rule out case (1).
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As also stated in Assumption (A3b), D′′(e) ≥ 0 and D′′′(e) ≥ 0. So with Assumption(A3b), the second part of d2V (e; )
de2




≥ 0, d2V (e; )
de2
≤ 0.
As a consequence, the equilibrium e can be found by comparing the corresponding
objective functions for the stationary points that are obtained by using the \rst-order
approach" (one if L <D′(e) and one or more than one if D′′′(e) > 0 and L ≥D′(e)).
A.2.2 Proof of Lemma 5:
Consider all the possible shapes of the objective function over e, one can easily show
that as long as
d2V (e; )
de2
≤ 0 for any e, the objective function is a hump shape with only
one stationary point.(SOCc) can be rewritten as:
d2V (e; )
de2
= −2(1 − ) ⋅ pe[(L −D′(e)) + (1 − )pe]
3(e)
−(2 − 2(e)) ⋅D′′(e) + (e)(1 − (e)) ⋅ eD′′′(e)
2(e)
To insure a non-positive second-order derivative for any e, we need to have:
D′(e) ≤ L + 2(1 − )pe

+ (e)(2 − 2(e))D′′(e) + 2(e)(1 − (e))eD′′′(e)
2(1 − )pe :
A.2.3 Proof of Lemma 11:
This proof is similar to the proof of Lemma 4. But now with risk-taking moral hazard,
V (e; ) is not a continuous function of e. It has a discontinuous point at e = eFB (where
L = D′(e)). Correspondingly, there are three potential solutions of e: (1) at the corners,
or (2) at the discontinuity points, or (3) among the stationary points (where dV (e; )
de
= 0).
Same as in the proof of Lemma 4, (1) can be easily ruled out.
Again, with Assumption (A3b), the second part of d2V (e; )
de2
(see equation (SOC)) is
always non-positive. Therefore, when
dV (e; )
de
≥ 0, d2V (e; )
de2
≤ 0. And the optimal solution
of e must be either (2) at the discontinuity points or (3) among the stationary points.
For (2), according to (IC ′a), there is only one discontinuity point at e = eFB where
L =D′(e).
As a consequence, the equilibrium e can be found by comparing the corresponding
objective functions under second-best for e = eFB and for the stationary points that are
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obtained by using the \rst-order approach" (one such that L < D′(e) and one or more
than one if D′′′(e) > 0 such that L ≥D′(e)).
A.2.4 Proof of Lemma 12:








∣e=0 > 0, the part in the region of L <D′(e) is a hump shape.






∣e=eFB ;a=a ≥ 0, the part in the region of L ≥D′(e) is another hump shape;
otherwise, it is the right part of another hump shape with a peak value at point
e = eFB.
(SOC) can be rewritten as:
d2V (e; )
de2
= −2(1 − ) ⋅ pe(a∗; )[(L −D′(e)) + (1 − )pe(a∗; )]
3(e)
−(2 − 2(e)) ⋅D′′(e) + (e)(1 − (e)) ⋅ eD′′′(e)
2(e)
To insure a non-positive second-order derivative for any e, we need to have:
D′(e) ≤ L + 2(1 − )pe(a∗; )

+ (e)(2 − 2(e))D′′(e) + 2(e)(1 − (e))eD′′′(e)
2(1 − )pe(a∗; ) :
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